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Abstract 
 
THE INCREASING CALLS FOR A HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER 
AND PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE IN WATER POLICY 
 
Jee Eun Song, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2019 
 
 
 
 
The historical pendulum between public and private sectors and mixed econometric 
outcomes of recent private sector participation in water management indicate that decision making 
of water policy is very much a political process rather than an economic or technical based one.  
Consequently, it gets more important to understand how water policy is formulated and 
implemented and under what political influences, as well as what institutional arrangements in the 
processes of bidding, monitoring, negotiating, and regulating have been attempted, succeeded or 
failed.  This study aims to answers to these questions by assessing four cases in the Global South: 
Cochabamba (Bolivia), Uruguay, Johannesburg (South Africa), and Manila (Philippines), where 
the government implemented either or both private sector participation and re-municipalization in 
past decades.  By employing the Advocacy Coalition Framework, Stakeholder Analysis, and 
Discourse Network Analysis, this study analyzes the coalitions which hold different policy core 
beliefs on water, their strategies to translate their beliefs on policy making, and institutional 
arrangements to adjust the policy after internal and external events.  The content analysis with 
secondary data collected by Nexis Lexis and two interviews with experts were employed to obtain 
in-depth understanding on the cases.  The study concludes that grassroots civil society 
organizations, which call for a human right to water and participatory governance, have increased 
their political leverage by forming powerful coalitions in water management policy subsystem.  
Their calls have been reflected in new constitutions in Bolivia and Uruguay, and new institutional 
 v 
arrangements in Johannesburg and Manila, to acknowledge the responsibility of the state as a water 
provider and leader of water conservation and to foster more institutionalized civic spaces in water 
management.   
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
To understand how water management policy has been made and implemented is the 
interest of this study.  Historically, state governments and private companies have been main actors 
in water management.  Previous literature, therefore, mainly focused on the evaluation of 
respective outcomes between public and private sector management models.  This study, however, 
instead of focusing the roles of public and private sectors and their technical and financial impacts 
on water service, will pay more attention to three factors: 1) coalitions based on policy core belief, 
2) internal and external events which make the policy subsystem unstable, and 3) institutional 
arrangements to support water policy implementation.  To begin, this study reviews the history of 
water policy and supporting economic theories that have shaped previous water management 
policies with respect to greater or lesser roles of government and market.  Secondly, this study 
summarizes econometric outcomes of water privatization in literature, which have guided the 
agenda of this study.  Thirdly, four case studies, Cochabamba (Bolivia), Uruguay, Johannesburg 
(South Africa), and Manila (Philippines), will be analyzed to understand the three factors under 
the Advocacy Coalition Framework, Stakeholder Analysis, and Discourse Network Analysis.  The 
findings of this study comparatively drawn from the four cases are presented in the Chapter 4 
Comparative Analysis.   
The findings of this study will redound to the benefit of society considering that coalitions 
with different policy core beliefs on water play important roles in policy making and 
implementation in water management.  This study, by applying Advocacy Coalition Framework, 
Stakeholder Analysis, and Discourse Network Analysis, attempts to acknowledge various 
stakeholders at different sectors and jurisdictions that were previously not considered as powerful 
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in the field of water management.  In addition, this study adds more explanatory power to the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework by providing a timeline of each variable in the framework.  This 
way helps researchers who apply the Advocacy Coalition Framework to present a wide range of 
variables they capture and the causal relationship among the variables in a dynamic way rather 
than a static way.  In sum, the greater demands for understanding coalitions of multiple 
stakeholders, their core beliefs on water, and their relationships justifies the need for more 
wholistic approaches to water management rather than solely relying on public and private sectors.  
Thus, governments who apply the recommended approach derived from the results of this study 
will be able to proceed to execute processes of reconciling different core beliefs and pulling 
essential political supports to lead to successful policy outcomes.   
 
1.1 HISTORY OF WATER MANAGEMENT POLICY AND SUPPORTING THEORIES  
In history, the main actors of water service have fluctuated back and forth between public 
and private sectors.  During 18th century, private companies were the main drivers of water 
infrastructure development in industrialized countries like Europe and the United States (U.S.)  
During this time, lack of public capital and business motives combined with rapid urban growth 
to draw private companies into water service (Prasad, 2007a).  However, in the early 19th century, 
the countries started to regulate and municipalize water entities due to unsatisfactory water service 
from private companies and because of public health concerns (Prasad, 2007a).  For example, in 
the U.S., 60-percent of piped water systems were privately owned in 1850 (Cutler et al., 2006).  
This share declined to 30-percent in 1924 after severe cholera outbreaks in 1832 and 1835 which 
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motivated municipalization of water service in big cities as well as the establishment of Public 
Health Act in 1848 (Cutler et al., 2006).  In industrialized nations, the public management model 
was perceived as the remedy for market failures such as externalities and monopolies.  
Contrary to the experiences of Europe and the U.S., the roles of private and public actors 
in developing countries are dependent upon the colonial history of each country (Gandy, 2006).  
The ex-French colonies in sub-Saharan Africa mostly adopted the French model of involving the 
private sector in water services in the 19th century (Gandy, 2006).  In ex-British colonies including 
India and Lagos, British private capital was instrumental in setting up the first centralized water 
supply system.  Yet, the lack of financial support for developing water system led to an explosion 
of a popular uprisings against private water companies (Gandy, 2006).  Subsequently, in the early 
20th century, many colonial countries resented foreign ownership of private firms after the colonial 
legacy and such nationalization was justified as a means to overcome decades of colonial 
exploitation (Prasad, 2007a).  In developing countries, these justifications were coupled with 
arguments that public ownership and management facilitated “economic independence” and 
planned development which was central part of state formation process in the post-colonial period.  
Therefore, by the late 1970s, public ownership of water entities became common in both developed 
and developing countries for different reasons, public health concerns and economic 
independence, respectively, and it experienced a period of popularity in late 19th and early 20th 
centuries (Prasad, 2007a).   
In the 1990s, the second march towards privatization was triggered by three main drivers: 
1) Thatcher’s privatization policy; 2) the ensuing global emphasis on free market policies led by 
international donors; and 3) the fall of communism.  The first driver of water privatization was 
Margaret Thatcher’s privatization policy launched in England in 1979.  Her policy is based on 
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fundamental theorem of welfare economics, focusing on the advantages of the private management 
model.  According to welfare economics, a competitive equilibrium is Pareto-optimal which means 
no other allocation of resources can make someone better off without making someone else worse 
off.  Under such a competitive equilibrium assumption, the society would be better off as 
privatization creates a free (less government), populist (better society), pragmatic (effective) and 
more productive business-oriented world (Savas, 1987).  This pro-market theory has also shaped 
the approaches of major international donors and financial institutions, both of which are other 
drivers of water privatization.  They address global emphasis on free market policies in that water 
sector privatization could attract more financial investment and provide more efficient 
management model for delivering services compared to the state (Yarrow, 1999).  The World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund, for example, have spread the idea of a private management 
model through the conditionality of their lending process (Grusky, 2001; World Bank, 1993).  The 
third driver of water privatization in the 20th century was the collapse of communism in the former 
Soviet-bloc countries and Eastern Europe.  Privatization symbolized an ideological shift where 
societies moved from communism to market economy (Crawford et al., 1995).  As a result of these 
three drivers, water privatization spread rapidly until 2000 in the U.S., Asia, Latin America, and 
Africa as a means to reform the public sector, increase infrastructure investment by developing 
capital market, and improve water access and management efficiency (IMF, 2007; World Bank, 
2009).    
The concept of water privatization is associated with neo-liberal reform strategies that 
emphasize market-oriented reform to achieve four major objectives: 1) to achieve higher allocative 
and productive efficiency; 2) to strengthen the role of the private sector in the economy; 3) to 
improve the public sector’s financial position; 4) to free resources for allocation in other important 
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sectors such as social policy (Kessides, 2004; Robison et al., 2005; Sheshinski et al., 2003).  In 
practice, this school of thought implements privatization as a mean to practice full-cost recovery, 
fiscal discipline, investment and financial liberalization, deregulation, decentralization, and 
eventually a reduced role of the state.  Under the neo-liberal reform strategies, the water sector has 
been re-designed and evaluated to be commercialized, marketized, modernized, financialized, and 
corporatized to allow private sectors to participate in water ownership and management (Bakker, 
2007; Bayliss, 2014; Kessides, 2004; McDonald et al., 2005a).   
Critics of water privatization claim that the argument of market superiority and efficiency 
is made based on strong assumptions that there are no externalities in production or consumption, 
that the product is not a public good, that the market is not a monopolistic structure, and that 
information costs are low (Ballance et al., 2005; Megginson, 2005).  They argue that once these 
assumptions are violated, the case for private sector participation becomes less compelling and 
more complex.  Their argument lies on the fact that the water industry is naturally monopolistic 
and therefore does not fit into standard economic theory regarding competition.  In the situation of 
monopoly and unusual water market, competition could be available, but its benefits would be 
minimal (Ballance et al., 2005).  In this view, proponents of state ownership and management have 
theoretically justified government control in three principal ways (Megginson, 2005): 1) it allows 
pursuit of social objectives, not just profit maximization; 2) it responds to market failures; and 3) 
it responds to asymmetric information and incomplete contracts.  
While the debates over the roles of public and private models in water management were 
ongoing, the experience of many developing countries in reality showed that they failed to attract 
private funding for infrastructure investment, faced massive increases of tariffs, and created 
additional burden on the poor (Prasad, 2007b; World Bank, 2006).  Consequently, public roles for 
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infrastructure investment continued to be important, and international donors started to pay more 
attention on Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), which arrange different responsibilities and roles 
of private and public sectors in terms of ownership, building, financing, and operation and 
management, depending on each entity’s needs and capability as shown in Table 1.  Table 1 shows 
various forms of PPPs in terms of allocation of responsibilities of public and private sectors in the 
water sector (OECD, 2009).
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Table 1. Allocation of responsibilities for Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) options 
 
*BOT and DBO: Build-Operate-Transfer and Design-Build-Operation types 
Source: OECD, 2009 
 
 Service 
Contract 
Management 
Contract 
Lease/ 
Affermage 
Concession BOT 
or DBO* 
Joint 
venture 
Divestiture 
Asset ownership Public Public Public Private/Public Private/Public Private/Public Private 
Capital 
investment 
Public Public Public Private Private Private/Public Private 
Commercial risk Public Public Shared Private Private Private/Public Private 
Operations/ 
maintenance 
Private/ 
Public 
Private Private Private Private Private/Public Private 
Contract 
duration 
1-2 years 3-5 years 8-15 years 25-30 years 20-30 years Infinite Infinite 
Source  
of remuneration  
of operator 
Municipality Municipality: 
fee is fixed or 
based on 
performance 
Operator 
collects user 
fees: 
Lease: fee paid 
by municipality 
Affermage: 
revenue shared 
Users Municipality Users Users 
Examples Mexico City 
Chennai 
Johannesburg 
Uruguay 
Amman 
Cartagena 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Senegal 
Manilla 
Cochabamba 
Gabon 
Jakarta 
China 
India 
Malaysia 
México 
Morocco 
Cartagena 
Netherlands 
Chongqing 
Sino 
French Water 
Supply 
England 
and Wales 
Chile 
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When it comes to water privatization, the term of privatization usually covers the transfer 
from public to private in terms of management and service operation.  Note that the term is not 
always accompanied by the change of asset ownership.  It is not common to fully privatize water 
and sewerage system, with ownership transferred from the state to private company.  Ninety-two 
percent of contracts with private sector made between 1991 and 2007 fell into the categories of 
management contract, lease, concession and BOT (OECD, 2009).   
Not long after Public-Private Partnership programs were implemented in the water sector, 
several highly visible contracts, such as Cochabamba and Buenos Aires, ran into difficulties that 
led to the early termination of contracts and cancelation.  The World Bank reported that 22 
contracts out of 228 awarded to the private sector between 1991 and 2007 were terminated early 
following conflicts between the government and the operator and 18 contracts were expired and 
not renewed (World Bank, 2009).  Another measure from the Public Service International (PSI) 
reported that 180 contracts were terminated early or not renewed and that water service was fully 
returned from the private company to public hands between 2000 and 2014.  Similarly, the 
Transnational Institute (TNI) reported that 235 cases of water re-municipalization occurred 
between 2000 and 2010 in 37 countries, including high, middle, and low income ones (TNI, 2015).  
They claimed that the number of cases doubled in the 2010-2015 period compared with 2000-
2010.  While private sector participation has continued to be observed in the water sector and 
encouraged by major international donor agencies, the re-municipalization of water service has 
been a more prominent trend both in the global North and the global South since 2000.  The term 
“re-municipalization” in this study is broadly used to depict the replacement of the private sector’s 
management and service operation with direct public provision by a public authority.  Figure 1 
shows the number of re-municipalization cases reported by the PSI as of 2014 (PSIRU, 2014) .    
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Figure 1. The number of cases that water was turned back to public hand after privatization 
Source: Public Service International, 2015 
1.2 OUTCOMES OF PRIVATE MANAGEMENT MODELS IN WATER SECTOR 
There has been much research on the subject of private sector participation in water 
management that focuses on quantitative outcomes such as child mortality as a proxy of water 
quality and access, service improvement in terms of provision and availability, cost-effectiveness, 
tariff increase, and labor productivity (Araral, 2009; Bel et al., 2008; Galiani et al., 2005; 
Kirkpatrick et al., 2006; Lobina et al., 2000; Merrett, 2004; Shandra et al., 2011; Wallsten et al., 
2002).  For example, Wallsten and Clarke study the outcomes of private sector participation in 
water supply in Africa in the mid to late 1990s (Wallsten et al., 2002).  They report that service 
coverage was increased under the private operation model and conclude that private sector 
participation could improve service provision.  However, they note that only focusing on one 
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measure, such as increasing service coverage, may lead to a faulty conclusion on the superiority 
of private sector participation because there may also be offsetting service difficulties and 
especially higher charges when supplies are privatized.  Another study from Bel and Warner 
(2008) analyzes the cost of water production run by private companies since 1970, and claims 
there is no benefit of cost savings from private sector participation given monopolistic markets 
absent any competition and high transaction costs with incomplete contracts (Bel et al., 2008).  
Similarly, Kirkpatrick et al., reviewed econometric evidence on the impact of water private sector 
participation in Africa using a range of performance measures including water availability, labor 
cost, production cost, operating cost, number of connections, total volume of water, capital 
utilization, and consumer charges.  They report that water privatization had higher labor 
productivity and production efficiency, but failed to prove their superiority on cost performance 
compared to state provision (Kirkpatrick et al., 2006).  The similar conclusion was drawn by 
Suárez-Varela et al.  They examine spanish water facilities at municipal level and report that  
private management is more efficient in the use of labor input, mainly because of the technological 
restrictions faced by public management units, such as legal and institutional restrictions, but failed 
to prove higher efficiency of private management at operational costs (Suárez-Varela et al., 2017).   
In addition to production and cost efficiencies, another measure on the comparison between private 
and public management is water conservation.  A study from Homsy reports that municipalities 
with government-owned water utilities adopt more sustainability measures than those with 
investor-owned service through inter-departmental coordination (Homsy, 2018).   
These analyses are valuable attempts to evaluate the impact of water privatization using 
econometric indicators.  Yet, such indicators are not easily measurable within the confines of the 
public vs. private water debate, especially given insufficient data collected and publicly available 
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in the Global South.  As a result, those studies assess the respective outcomes of the public vs. 
private model, and generalized outcomes of various PPP models have been consequently very 
difficult and controversial.  In sum, many researchers agree that the outcomes of the private sector 
participation model in water management largely depend on local context and politics associated 
with particularities of each country and city (Bakker, 2007; Kirkpatrick et al., 2006; Larbi et al., 
2006).  It is argued that there is no systematic optimal choice between public and private delivery 
and other factors such as market structure, industrial organization of the service sector, and 
government management, oversight and regulation are much more important. 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY 
Previous discussion on the historical pendulum between public and private sectors and 
lessons from previous literature on the outcomes of private sector participation indicate that water 
policy making is much more a political process which does not necessarily follow econometric 
measures.  Therefore, it is less important who owns, operates and manages water service and to 
what extent.  What is more important is to understand how water policy is formulated and 
implemented and under what political influences, as well as what institutional arrangements have 
been attempted, succeeded or failed to support the water policy in the processes of bidding, 
monitoring, negotiating, and regulating.  This study aims to answers to these two questions by 
assessing four cases in the Global South: Cochabamba (Bolivia), Uruguay, Johannesburg (South 
Africa), and Manila (Philippines), where the government implemented either both private sector 
participation and/or re-municipalization policies in past decades.  During the process of water 
policy changes, governments have implemented a variety of institutional arrangements to achieve 
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their water policy goals, which are the main subjects of this study.   The overall goal of the study 
is to identify and articulate meaningful policy lessons and recommendations for the future of water 
policy frameworks in the Global South.  At the same time, the rising trend of water re-
municipalization in the Global South in recent years holds important lessons for future water 
privatization and water services models implemented in developing countries with increasing 
levels of urban sprawl and poverty. 
1.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
This study utilizes the concepts derived from Advocacy Coalitions Framework, 
Stakeholder Analysis, and Discourse Network Analysis.   
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
(1994).  The ACF explains that a policy is made by the interaction of policy participants who strive 
to translate components of their belief systems into actual policy (Jenkins-Smith et al., 1994).  
Within the ACF, policy participants will seek allies with people who hold similar policy core 
beliefs and develop complementary strategies as they gradually learn more about various aspects 
of the problem over time and experiment with a variety of means to achieve their policy objectives 
(Jenkins-Smith et al., 1994).  
The ACF was developed in response to three needs which lacked from previous literature in 
the study of policy making process: 1) the need of interpretation on the heuristic stages as an inadequate 
causal theory of the policy process (Jenkins-Smith et al., 1994); 2) the need of system-based theories 
of  policy making rather than top-down or bottom up approaches in implementation (Sabatier, 1986);  
3) the need of theory that takes into account on the role of scientific and technical information in the 
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policy process (Sabatier, 1988).  To address these issues, the ACF established a set of assumptions 
described below (source: Weible et al, 2007):  
1) a central role of scientific and technical information in policy processes; 
2) a time perspective of 10 years or more to understand policy change; 
3) policy subsystems as the primary unit of analysis; 
4) a broad set of subsystem actors that not only include more than the traditional iron 
triangles’ members but also officials from all levels of government, consultants, scientists, 
and members of the media; 
5) a perspective that policies and programs are best thought of as translations of beliefs. 
Among the assumptions, the ACF explicitly identifies beliefs as the causal driver for political 
behavior (Weible et al., 2007b).   
The ACF has been revised several times as many case studies confirmed and challenged 
the framework for years.  One of the major revisions to the ACF was to reformulate the pluralist 
system in the U.S. to corporatist regimes that are more suitable to the developing countries.  To do 
so, the revisions included adding two sets of variables as important long-term opportunity 
structures: 1) the degree of consensus needed for major policy change which affects the density 
and membership of coalitions and coalition strategy in reaching agreements; and 2) the degree of 
openness in political systems because corporatist systems in the developing countries are less open, 
more centralized, and restrict participation.  Figure 2 shows the revised version of the ACF. 
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Figure 2. 2007 Advocacy Coalition Framework developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
and revised by Sabatier and Weible 
Source: Weible et al, 2009 
  
The ACF identifies four paths to policy change in a policy subsystem. The below 
description is adopted from Weible et al, 2007:  
1) External subsystem events or shocks including broad changes in socioeconomic 
conditions, public opinion, governing coalitions, and other subsystems can foster change 
in a subsystem by shifting and augmenting resources, tipping the power of coalitions, and 
changing beliefs.  External events or policy failure prompt subsystem instability and 
the potential for rapid, major policy change;  
15 
2) Policy-oriented learning affects secondary beliefs or secondary aspects of the policy 
subsystem.  The learning is defined as “relatively enduring alternations of thought or 
behavioral intentions that result from experience and/or new information and that are 
concerned with the attainment or revision of policy objectives”;  
3) Internal subsystem events occur within the subsystem and are expected to highlight 
failures in the current subsystem;  
4) Alternate dispute resolution literature affects the policy through negotiated agreements 
involving two or more coalitions and makes the cross-coalition learning possible.  
 
In addition to the ACF, Stakeholder Analysis is also applied in this study.  The Stakeholder 
Analysis is defined by identifying opportunities and constraints for calculating the likelihood that 
a strategy, venue, or alternative will be successful in initiating or preventing belief and policy 
change (Reed et al., 2009).  Stakeholder Analysis addresses questions which include: who are the 
stakeholders to include in the analysis; what are the stakeholders' interests and beliefs; who 
controls critical resources; with whom do stakeholders form coalitions (Prell et al., 2009; Reed et 
al., 2009).  Therefore, the processes of Stakeholder Analysis include following the activities: 
identifying all stakeholders, documenting stakeholders’ needs, and assessing and analyzing 
stakeholders’ interest and expectations.   
Thirdly, Discourse Network Analysis is utilized in this study to offer a framework to 
analyze the interaction and polarization among stakeholders by using a combination of content 
analysis and dynamic network analysis.  Leifeld (2013) claims that stakeholders make normative 
claims about policies conditional on each other, which creates dynamic network phenomenon 
(Leifeld, 2013).  He argues there are subsystems with specific characteristics in which one 
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hegemonic coalition is the default, called a "normal state."  In these subsystems, polarization and 
shifting coalition memberships interact to produce coalition turnover and major policy change.  
That is, a polarization into competing coalitions and the shift back to a single coalition with new 
members and new beliefs necessarily occurs before major policy change can take place (Leifeld, 
2013).  Discourse Network Analysis is employed in this study to describe such processes of 
predating major policy change and demonstrate how consensus and polarization may alternate to 
produce policy stability or change.  Network diagrams among stakeholders in this study depict 
main stakeholders, their policy belief, and connections among stakeholders in the water policy 
subsystem.  The color of the stakeholders (nodes) is determined by which policy core belief the 
stakeholder holds. The shape of the stakeholder (nodes) is determined by which sector the 
stakeholder represents among public, private, nonprofit, and state-owned options.  Lines between 
stakeholders represent relationships. The relationship defined in this study is extensive, meaning 
that it includes any activities among stakeholders given a wide range of activities analyzed from 
multiple sources of content analysis.  For example, if ‘A’ organization reported to have a meeting 
with ‘B’ organization, it was marked as an activity between A and B organizations.  With the same 
manner, if ‘A’ collaborates with ‘B’, participates in the same meeting, conference, or coalition 
with ‘B’, makes a law or a policy that influences on ‘B’ under governmental hierarchical structure, 
or announces a position statement on the policy that ‘B’ created, their activities are all marked as 
a ‘relationship’ between the two.  In the network diagram, stakeholders who have a strong 
relationship are shown in close distance with a short tie, whereas stakeholders with a weak or no 
relationship are shown in long distance with a long tie or no tie, respectively.  If most stakeholders 
are all connected each other, it shows a strong relationship that facilitates effective information 
and value sharing within the network.  
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Based on the ACF, Stakeholder Analysis, and Discourse Network Analysis, the key terms 
described below will be used in this study.  
1) The unit of analysis is a policy subsystem where policy stakeholders attempt to translate 
their beliefs into a policy.  Subsystem is an issue-specific network where coalitions compete to 
dominate policymaking.  
2) Stakeholders in a policy subsystem include local, state, and federal government 
officials, politicians, business groups, civil society organizations at grass-root, national, and 
international levels, researchers and scientists, and members of the media.  By adopting network 
analysis, this study calculates betweenness centrality which measures the extent to which a 
stakeholder lies on paths between other stakeholders. Betweenness centrality is calculated by 
summing how many times a node can interrupt the shortest paths between the other two nodes of. 
The betweenness centrality of a node B is given by the expression:  
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐵) = ∑
𝑁𝐴𝐶(𝐵)
𝑁𝐴𝐶
𝐴≠𝐵≠𝐶
 
When NAC(B) is the total number of shortest paths from node A to node C, and NAC is the number 
of those paths passing through B. That is, stakeholders with high betweenness likely have 
considerable influence within a network by virtue of their control over information passing 
between others.   
3) Beliefs motivate policy stakeholders to convert it into an actual policy.  The ACF 
developed three tier beliefs: i) deep core belief which is the most stable among the beliefs and are 
predominately normative; ii) policy core belief which is of moderate scope and span the 
substantive and geographic breadth of a policy subsystem; iii) secondary beliefs are more 
substantively and geographically narrow in scope, and more empirically based (Weible et al., 
2007).   
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Reflecting the ACF’s concept of policy core belief, this study categorizes policy core 
beliefs that are observed regarding water policy into four groups, economic, social, ecological, and 
administrative beliefs, which are defined and adopted from Miranda et al. (2011).  Miranda et al., 
through a  thorough literature review on water crisis and water conflict issues, investigates how 
different actors value water, and present the four main approaches to water governance in an 
attempt to contribute to a greater understanding of the perspectives, interests, and main concerns 
of the various actors in the water sector.  They also differentiates the approaches to the legitimacy 
of main actors, priority set up, and management models in water governance as shown in Table 2 
(Miranda et al., 2011).  Note that the term, “views”, in the study of Miranda et al., is translated 
into the term, “beliefs”, in this study and two terms are used interchangeably here by assuming 
that both determine perspectives and approaches to water-related issues.  Beliefs could sound less 
scientific as they are the convictions that people generally hold to be true and how people expect 
things to be without actual proof or evidence.  However, Advocacy Coalition Framework explains 
that beliefs, especially “shared beliefs” are critical for formulating a coalition and influential to 
policies and institutional arrangements in water management.  For this reason, the distinct views 
on water discerned from Miranda et al., have been adopted in this study as a mean to explain 
fundamental difference in core beliefs across coalitions.      
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Table 2. Categorization of core beliefs on water employed in this study 
 Economic Social  Ecological Administrative 
water to be 
seen as 
economic good social good ecological good sector 
main concern Market human beings environment administration 
main 
rationality 
prosperity, 
growth, free 
market 
social justice 
environmental 
justice 
pragmatic resource 
management 
main 
governance 
approach 
elitist, 
monopoly, new 
public 
management 
democratic, 
participative 
inclusive, 
reflexive corporate 
social 
responsibility 
concertation 
network 
main 
management 
models 
private water 
boards, PPP 
public water 
boards, PUP, 
multi 
stakeholder 
partnerships 
ecosystem 
management, 
multi stakeholder 
arrangement 
integrated water 
resource 
management, 
basin management 
economic 
valuation 
market price, 
tariffs 
regulation, 
polluters pay 
principle 
tariff, subsidy 
non-compensable, 
externalities 
control payment 
tariff, subsidy 
Source: Miranda et al., 2011 
Briefly, the main concern of ‘economic belief’  is market and efficiency, and it treats water 
as an economic good; the main concern of ‘social belief’ is human rights and low income groups, 
and it treats water as a social good; the main concern of ‘ecological belief’ is ecological 
sustainability for future generation, and it treats water as an ecological good; the main concern of 
‘administrative belief’ is administration, and it treats water as a sector which needs to be managed 
under governments.  Note that there are overlaps in governance and management approaches 
among different views, and it is often not easy to assign one core belief for a stakeholder following 
this categorization.  The beliefs are sometime clear in that they appear in the media reports or 
organization reports, but not all the times.  Therefore, it is researcher’s judgement that proceed and 
conceptualize activities and actions of stakeholders and assigns them into different core beliefs, 
which may bring a concern about the validity of this approach.  Jenkins-Smith, one of the ACF 
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developers, admits that belief conceptualization and measures within the ACF may be incorrect 
(Jenkins-Smith et al., 1994).  Yet, by recognizing the distinct policy core belief under which key 
actors and their coalitions operate, this study attempts to reveal how water policy is formulated 
and implemented in the presence of different core beliefs.  
4) Advocacy coalitions are formed by policy participants who seek allies to accomplish 
the goal of translating their core belief to policy through their strategies.  A coalition is a group of 
people who share a particular belief system and show a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity 
over time (Weible et al., 2007a).  Within a subsystem, coalitions engage in policy learning and 
produce relatively minor policy change to adapt the secondary aspects of their beliefs in light of 
new information. 
5) Policy learning occurs within and across coalitions while implementing a policy.  
Learning follows the routine monitoring of implementation, as members consider how policy 
contributes to positive or unintended outcomes and whether their beliefs are challenged or 
supported by the evidence and how it is presented by their competitors (Weible et al., 2007a). 
6) Internal and external events increase subsystem instability and result in policy change.  
An internal event relates to policy failure, which may contribute to a crisis of confidence in one 
coalition.  It may prompt a coalition to revisit its policy core beliefs, perhaps following a realization 
by many of its actors that existing policies have failed monumentally, which is often followed by 
their departure to a different coalition (Weible et al., 2007a).  Another coalition can use the 
experience of failure to reinforce its position within the subsystem, largely by demonstrating that 
its belief system is best equipped to interpret new information and solve the policy problem 
(Weible et al., 2007a).  External events vary from global recession and environmental crises to the 
election of a new government with beliefs that favor one coalition over another.  
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7) Interactions among stakeholders and their network structure reveal the presence of 
coalition and polarization among stakeholders as well as the absence of interactions, which are 
necessary to formulate consensus and policy learning within subsystem.  
8) Strategies are carried out by stakeholders to influence the decisions in several political 
venues where stakeholders can have institutional access and opportunity to influence 
policymaking.  Stakeholders often launch offenses in several venues and defend their interests in 
several venues simultaneously (Prell et al., 2009).  Based on Weible and Sabatier (2007), potential 
strategies include elections, public referenda and decisions in legislatures, chief executives, courts, 
and agencies (Weible et al., 2007a).  Therefore, this study identifies which stakeholders and their 
coalitions initiated what strategies and political venues and whether they succeeded in making 
their core belief a dominant paradigm through them.   
9) Openness of political system is needed to build long-term coalition opportunity 
structures.  The degree of openness of political system, depends on two things: the number of 
decision-making venues, and the accessibility of those venues (Weible et al., 2007b).  In water 
management, federalism and fragmentation of decision-making system have created a highly 
fragmented system with multiple decision-making venues.  As a result, water policy is often made 
separate from other resource managements and located in different units of government that 
contradict each other or conflict with other policy areas.  Making coordinated water policy that 
systematically integrates natural resource protection, economic development, equity, and other 
factors is need for comprehensive policy making and reform that would protect a broader array of 
interests and provide for fuller public participation in water decision making.  This study 
investigates whether the government of each case study has created a unit for coordination among 
governments at different jurisdictions and public participation in water policy as a mean to foster 
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accessibility to decision making venues by multiple stakeholders and therefore openness of 
political system.  
 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Based on the concepts derived from this framework, the research aims to answer to 
following questions: 
 
How water policy in the Global South is formulated and implemented under what 
political influences;  
1) Who are the main policy stakeholders in the decision making? 
2) What are their policy core beliefs?  
3) What institutional arrangements have been set up to adapt these core beliefs? 
4) Which coalitions practice their political leverage with what strategies? 
5) Does policy leaning occur within or across coalitions? 
6) Is there consensus of sociocultural values and social structures for policy change? 
7) Is there openness of political system to move forward to a better-suited policy 
implementation? 
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2.0 METHODOLOGY 
2.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study applies the concepts derived from the theoretical frameworks in order to 
illuminate the policy subsystem of well-documented cases of private sector participation and re-
municipalization that have occurred in Cochabamba (Bolivia), Uruguay, Johannesburg (South 
Africa), and Manila (Philippines).  These four cases are selected because they adopted water 
policy(s) more than 10 years ago and experienced a variety of internal and external events for past 
decades, which allows the researcher to understand the policy change thoroughly.  Some of them 
resulted in a dramatic policy change while others brought different institutional arrangements and 
minor policy changes.  Given the premise that it is impossible to generalize the experiences of 
water policy implementation in the Global South, the four cases possess geographically and 
socioeconomically different backgrounds, which would reveal a variety of issues in water policy 
making and implementation.  The case studies are analyzed using the concepts described in Section 
1.4 Theoretical Frameworks.  
2.2 DATA COLLECTION 
In order to identify stakeholders and their core beliefs in a policy subsystem, this study 
collects documents reported in LexisNexis (now, Nexis Uni).  LexisNexis is a digital database that 
provides full text of newspapers, magazines, blogs, federal and state court opinions, and academic 
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papers.  Using two key words of ‘city name’ and ‘water supply’, the database provides the most 
relevant reports for the processes of water policy making and implementation.  This analysis 
focuses on the time period starting from 1990 to August 31st, 2017 and the numbers of articles 
collected for each case are 775 for Uruguay, 773 for Cochabamba, 2,996 for Johannesburg, and 
2,522 for Manila, respectively.  It is believed that the secondary data collected through the Nexis 
Uni have generally a pre-established degree of validity and reliability as they are published in 
publicly accessible reports and media.  However, the use of secondary data may raise a concern 
on the validity of this study.  The researcher of this study uses the collected secondary data as a 
baseline and checks the facts by comparing other organization reports to improve accuracies of 
data.  Two interviews, one each for the Cochabamba and Uruguay cases, are conducted to improve 
the validity of findings from the analysis of the secondary data.  The interview questions and 
designs were approved prior to interviews by University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board 
PittPRO (approval number: 18120109). 
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3.0 CASE STUDIES 
This chapter discusses the subsystems of water management policy changes in 
Cochabamba, Uruguay, Johannesburg, and Manila.  Each case study follows analyses of 
stakeholders, their core belief, internal and external events, coalitions and break ups, strategies, 
and institutional arrangements to support the water policy.     
3.1 COCHABAMBA, BOLIVIA: A FAST-GROWING CITY WITH HISTORICAL 
WATER SHORTAGE 
Cochabamba experienced the most devastating water policy change from privatization to 
re-municipalization.  The interview with Jim Shultz, who is an executive director of the 
Democracy Center and lived in Cochabamba for the past 20 years and at the time of the policy 
change, was conducted to help the understanding of the Cochabamba water policy processes.  A 
Bolivian friend of the researcher of this study visited the SEMAPA in Cochabamba and submitted 
the translated interview questions in Spanish to an administrative staff, but the staff provided no 
answers unfortunately.  
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Figure 3. Cochabamba in Bolivia 
Source: Google Map 
 
Cochabamba is a city located in central Bolivia, whose population has been growing 
rapidly over the past decades from 1,110,000 in 1992 to 1,455,000 in 2001 (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística de Bolivia, 2010).  Half of the population lives in the city area and the other half lives 
in the rural area.  SEMAPA, a state-owned water and sewage entity, was built in 1967 and had 
provided water and sanitation service to the city.  Yet, due in part to the historical scarcity of water 
in the Cochabamba Valley, only 57 percent of the city's population had potable water coverage 
during 1990s (Nickson et al., 2002).  The remaining 43 percent gained water from other sources 
such as water trucks, private wells, or community water association (Nickson et al., 2002).  The 
population in rural areas, including farmers and coca growers, has installed and managed their own 
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water system for agriculture and living.  Due to the financial difficulties in operation, SEMAPA 
was contracted to private concessionaire in 1999 under the encouragement of the World Bank for 
their Public-Private Partnerships program and the Bolivian government experienced the strongest 
opposition from their citizens.  
 
1) Policy stakeholders and their policy core beliefs 
The content analysis revealed that a number of organizations participated directly and 
indirectly in policy formation for the Cochabamba case.  Table 3 shows the classification of 
organizations and their core beliefs on water.  
 
Table 3. Classification of organizations and their core beliefs on water in Cochabamba case 
View on 
water 
Local CSOs International CSOs Public actors Private 
actors 
Economic 
good 
Civic Committee 
New Republican 
Force (NFR) Party 
World Bank, IMF, Asian 
Development Bank, Green 
Peace 
President Banzer 
Mayor of 
Cochabamba 
AdT  
Bechtel  
Social 
good 
Coordinadora 
(FEDECOR, 
FAMRILES, COD, 
FMUC, and 
CSFTC) 
Society of Bolivian 
Engineers (SIB) 
   
America's Unions (AFL-
CIO) 
Public Services 
International  
Institute for Policy Studies  
Center for Agriculture and 
Labor Development 
Studies  
The Democracy Center  
Global Economy Project 
Citizens' Network on 
Essential Services 
International Forum on 
Globalization 
Institute for Agriculture 
and Trade Policy 
Global Exchange 
Inter-American Regional 
Secretary  
President Morales 
 
28 
Source: own analysis 
 
Table 3 indicates that there are numerous organizations and persons who participate in the 
subsystem of Cochabamba water policy making, including different levels of governments and 
their representatives, civil society organizations at local and international levels, international 
donors and private companies.  The key roles of the stakeholders and their policy core beliefs are 
discussed throughout this chapter.  
 
2) Water policy subsystem of Cochabamba 
Among many stakeholders, the content analysis of Cochabamba case reveals that not only 
public actors such as the mayor of Cochabamba and the government of Bolivia, but also civil 
society groups such as Coordinadora and Civic Committee act very influentially in policy 
subsystem. Their significance is proved by their high betweenness centrality as shown in Table 4, 
indicating that civil society groups, though they are not institutionalized stakeholders in 
governmental systems, played crucial roles in the decision making of water policy.  As explained 
Global Trade Watch, 
Public Citizen 
Latin America Centre 
Integrated Social 
Development Centre 
Peoples' Actions for 
Community 
Transformation 
Ecological 
good 
Bolivian Forum on 
the Environment 
Friends of the Earth     
Sector   EU GOB 
SEMAPA 
Super-intendency 
of Water (SSSB) 
Cochabamba 
government 
SOBOCE 
ICE-
Ingenious 
COBOSE 
ICE-
ASTALDI 
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previously, the betweenness centrality is calculated following the equation in Page 17 and based 
on the network among stakeholders captured in content analysis.  Higher betweenness centrality 
measures indicate stronger influence in policy subsystem.   
 
Table 4. Betweenness centrality of stakeholders in Cochabamba water policy subsystem 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  Source: own analysis, using R software 
 
Figure 4 shows the key stakeholders and their interactions with other stakeholders within 
Cochabamba water policy subsystem.  
 
Key Stakeholder Betweenness 
centrality 
COORDINADORA 68.183333       
MAYOR 26.816667        
GOB 9.766667        
CIVICCOMMITTEE 9.133333        
INT_CSOs        8.433333        
MISICUNI 7.533333        
MORALES 6.466667        
WB 5.816667        
ADT 5.450000 
SEMAPA 4.716667        
BECHTEL 3.533333        
BANZER 3.283333        
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Figure 4. Key stakeholders and their interactions with other stakeholders for Cochabamba 
case 
Policy core beliefs: Brown represents the social belief; Blue represents administration belief; 
Yellow represents economic belief; Green represents ecological belief following Table 2/ 
nonprofit in circle; public in triangle; private in diamond; state-owned in square / Ties among 
stakeholders mean relationship as explained in Page 16  
Source: own analysis using R software 
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Figure 4 shows that the interactions among stakeholders in the Cochabamba case are 
polarized between economic and social beliefs.  During the SEMAPA concession, most civil 
society organizations, except Civic Committee, hold the social belief and called for a human right 
for water.  On the other hand, the World Bank, President Banzer’s office, and the Civic Committee 
hold the economic belief and called for the need of private concessions for water management.  
Figure 4 also reveals that there is no institutionalized space for political participation by average 
citizens.  The two polarized groups and the absence of participatory space contributes to the 
emergence of disruptive protest as a mean to deliver citizens’ frustration to the government during 
the SEMAPA’s privatization.  Figure 5 shows the variables captured under the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework for Cochabamba case. 
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Figure 5. Variables captured under the Advocacy Coalition Framework for Cochabamba case 
Arrows indicate causal relationship between variables 
Source: own analysis, using AnyLogic software 
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3) Coalition of key stakeholders  
3-1) President Banzer, the World Bank, and Cochabamba mayor for SEMAPA 
privatization 
In Bolivia, the 1994 national water law called ‘SIRESE’ was enacted to centralize water 
management and the central government established a Super-intendency of Water (Later, Super-
intendency of Water and Sanitation in 1999 water law, SSSB) to enforce nationally-integrated 
regulation on water management (Official Gazette of Bolivia, 1994).  The Super-intendency of 
Water required any entity providing water services to hold a concession from the primary 
concessionaire.  Under President Banzer’s office (1997-2001), the SIRESE principle was 
strengthened by a 1999 water law called ‘Ley 2029’ in that a concession was required for any 
provision of water services, and continued to explicitly recognize the exclusive rights of the 
primary concessionaire in the area of concession (Official Gazette of Bolivia, 1999).   
At the time of concession in 1999, SEMAPA had accumulated a debt of $30 million, 
indicating that SEMAPA had been characterized by significant maintenance and administrative 
problems. Bechtel reported that 60-percent of the water pumped into the SEMAPA system was 
lost through leakage or theft (Bechtel, 2005).  In response to SEMAPA’s inefficiency and water 
shortage, the World Bank conditioned the approval of loans to Cochabamba in exchange for the 
Bolivian government's privatization of SEMAPA (Shultz, 2003).  Shultz who reported details of 
Cochabamba water conflicts to international society at the time of concession, criticized that the 
World Bank required the conditionality of SEMAPA’s privatization without considering the 
implication of it seriously (Shultz, Apr 29, 2019).  In 1997, President Banzer’s government 
recognized SEMAPA as a decentralized company of the municipality of the department of 
Cochabamba and ordered the restructuring of the Board of Directors as the first step toward 
34 
privatization.  Two years later, the service was delivered in concession to the consortium, Aguas 
del Tunari (AdT) for 40 years (Bechtel, 2005).  The AdT, a Cayman Islands corporation whose 
majority shareholder was International Water Limited, a subsidiary of an American engineering 
company, Bechtel corporation, was the single bidder for SEMAPA’s privatization, indicating that 
there was no competition introduced to the water market.  Other members of the AdT consortium 
included a Spanish corporation named Bengoa and four Bolivian companies.  
The AdT began operating the city's water and wastewater system on November 1, 1999.  
The consortium did not buy and did not own Cochabamba's water utility or water resources 
(Bechtel, 2005).  The concession required AdT to invest $85 million in the first five years, and a 
further $129 million over the life of the contract (Card, 2005).  In addition, AdT would also assume 
SEMAPA’s existing debt, and take on responsibility for the completion of the Misicuni project.   
Internal event: Failure of building consensus on tariff increase led by the Misicuni 
project  
In the late 1960s, a massive scheme known as the Misicuni Project was proposed to address 
the shortage of water supply in the Cochabamba.  This project involved building a dam more than 
46km away from Cochabamba which would pump water through a tunnel to be drilled underneath 
Cordillera mountain.  Despite spending $12 million on feasibility studies, the government of 
Bolivia failed to secure the bank loans necessary to finance the project, which would likely cost 
about $100-300 million (Kapoor, 2015).  Most of the financial institutions including the World 
Bank, rejected the project due to too much financial and technical risk involved (Global Water 
Report, 2000a).  Instead, they proposed an alternative called the ‘Corani project’ which did not 
involve building the 21 km tunnel to be drilled underneath a mountain range and thus was less 
expensive and less risky than Misicuni.  However, the completion of Misicuni project was critical 
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to achieve political goals of the President Banzer and the Cochabamba Mayor, Manfred Reyes 
Villa, because the project gained so much economic and political supports by local elites who 
stood to profit from the venture (Kapoor, 2015).  As a result, the Corani project proposal faced 
significant local and political resistance and, the mayor of Cochabamba therefore defeated the 
project and successfully added Misicuni project on the AdT concession (The NewYorker, 2002).  
The winning of the Misicuni project over the Corani project revealed that the decision-making 
process was not solely dependent on economic and technical evaluation, but rather more on vested 
interests of political leaders who get support from developers and industries.  
As the Misicuni project proceeded, a nontransparent tale of rent-seeking behaviors was 
observed during the AdT negotiation process.  Woodhouse reports that SOBOCE, a La Paz-based 
cement company and long- time competitor, COBOSE, a Cochabamba-based company, became a 
Bolivian partner of the AdT concession (Woodhouse, 2003), suspiciously because SOBOCE's 
president was a congressman whose party controlled the Ministry of Foreign Investment at the 
time of negotiation (Woodhouse, 2003).  Similarly, he also reports that Aguas y Energia, another 
Bolivian partner of the AdT, signed on to construct the Misicuni tunnel following AdT concession 
without a competitive bidding process because the owner of Aguas y Energia was reputed to be 
very close to the mayor of Cochabamba (Woodhouse, 2003).  The participation of SOBOCE and 
Aguas y Energia in the AdT concession discloses that the bidding process for the Misicuni project 
lacked transparency and was associated with rent-seeking activities of politicians and business 
group.  
Note that the inclusion of the Misicuni project was the unique aspect of the AdT concession 
opposed to other concessions in Bolivia such as the La Paz concession.  La Pas is the capital city 
of Bolivia and its water management was as inadequate as the one of Cochabamba except the fact 
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that they did not suffer from historical shortages of water.  The La Paz concession granted in 1997 
involved an investment of about $80 million over the first five years with a potential consumer 
base of 1.5 million people, while the AdT concession involved an investment of $200 million over 
the first five years with a potential consumer base of only 500,000 (Global Water Report, 2000a).  
The La Paz concession focused on expansion of water service to the mostly poor residents in urban 
area and was negotiated with the goal of implementing a cost recovery pricing system (The Nation, 
2005).  Their water rate increased before the private concession was granted and did not increase 
after the concession for five years (World Bank, 1999b).  The cost for expansion was cross-
subsidized under the structure of “industrial-to-residential cross-subsidy” in that the water rate for 
the poor was kept low (World Bank, 1999b).  Thus, the implementation of the La Paz concession 
was peaceful.  As of the second year of the contract, the concessionaire had met its network 
expansion targets.  Although the direct comparison between Cochabamba and La Paz cases were 
difficult given that the goals and conditions of the two concessions were very different, it is easy 
to observe that the political rent-seeking activities beyond the Misicuni project greatly contributed 
to the failure of the AdT concession.  
Before the SEMAPA was contracted out, the World Bank predicted that meeting costs of 
Misicuni project would require an immediate tariff increase of 38-percent, with a future increase 
of 20-percent (World Bank, 1999a).  Finally, the contract stipulated an expected return of 16-
percent for AdT, which Shultz said was very high (Shultz, Apr 29, 2019).  It was reported that 
during the first two months of operation, AdT increased water supply in the city by 30 percent and 
the water rate increased by 35 percent as stated in the contract (Special Unit for South-South 
Cooperation, 2002).  However, the 35-percent increase in water rate was exaggerated to consumers 
because of their increasing water usage as well as a new Increasing Block Tariff (IBT) structure 
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introduced by AdT (Nickson et al., 2002) .  The increasing water usage moved some users to 
higher-usage consumer category under the IBT system and charged them up to a 200-percent 
increase on their water bill (Nickson et al., 2002).  This sudden price hike outraged many residents 
in Cochabamba.  On December 28, 1999, approximately 15,000 to 20,000 people marched in the 
first mass protest at Cochabamba’s central plaza demanding that the Bolivian government 
renegotiate the contract with AdT and amend the 1999 Water Law (Multinational Monitor, 2005).   
 
3-2) Coalition of grassroot civil society organizations and their break-up: 
Coordinadora and Civic Committee 
Figure 4 indicates that grassroots civil society groups (CSOs) got political power during 
Cochabamba’s water conflict by forming a well-known coalition, Coordinadora.  It consisted of 
many local organizations, but was mainly integrated with five organizations: FEDECOR (a group 
of rural farmers), FAMRILES (a labor union of factory workers), COD (Departmental Workers' 
Central of Cochabamba), FMUC (Urban teacher’s federation), and CSFTC (Coca-grower’s 
federation led by current president Evo Morales).   
The FEDECOR represented indigenous peasant farmers from the rural area who had 
demanded the government respect their historically granted right to water.  Seven years before the 
privatization of SEMAPA, the government sent in the military to break blockades erected by small 
farmers in Quaillacollo, located 13 km away from Cochabamba, who were attempting to prevent 
SEMAPA from drilling deep wells for the city's water supply (Spronk et al., 2014b).  The 
government and SEMAPA gave up the drilling but the conflict between the government and 
farmers continued for years.  In 1997, the rural farmers founded FEDECOR in order to protect 
their water rights.  The members of the FEDECOR argued that these rights were inalienable 
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because they had long roots becase the farmers’ ancestors had occupied the areas for a long time 
(Spronk et al., 2014b).  Shultz explained that the farmers had very well-organized systems in place 
and had been able to manage their water system without any problem (Shultz, Apr 29, 2019).   
Another key organization in Coordinadora was the FABRILES led by Oscar Olivera, who 
was a shoe-factory worker at the time of concession.  He became a popular leader and received 
lots of attention from both domestic and international media during and after the protest.  The 
FABRILES adopted a politics of social-movement unionism, which advocates greater levels of 
democracy and equality for all people in the rural and urban areas of Cochabamba by networking 
with groups of people.   
The CSFTC represented coca growers in rural area and was led by Evo Morales, the current 
President of Bolivia.  The group demanded the end of coca eradication of coca leaf sponsored by 
the United States.  Though Ley 2029 was applied to only services of drinking water and sewage, 
as opposed to all water resources, it resulted in deep misunderstandings of farmers and coca 
growers in rural areas who were concerned that their own water system they had built and managed 
would be threatened and taken away by the private concessionaire.  Such misunderstandings 
stimulated them to participate in the protest against SEMAPA privatization.  
It should be also noted that the emergence of grassroot groups with indigenous people like 
the FEDECOR and the CSFTC implies the ongoing struggles seeking not only a human right to 
water, but also some level of autonomy and respect for their traditional ways of life (Arrington, 
2002; The Economist, 1998; Webber, 2011).  Particularly, rural farmers and coca-growers who 
had been threatened by President Banzer’s policy for eradication of coca plants, opposed the 
exclusivity clause granted to concessionaires in the 1999 law and demanded recognizing the right 
of small groups to maintain their independence from such large-scale concessions (Democracy 
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Center, 2003).  They feared the loss and destruction of their land and the waterscapes that would 
necessarily occur as a result of large-scale water transfers to distribute the water.  The participation 
of rural farmers and coca-growers played a significant role in galvanizing the resistance to the AdT 
concession, but also contributed to blurring the standpoints of the protests between a human right 
to water and autonomy (Woodhouse, 2003).    
In addition, the COD and the FMUC represented workers of department Cochabamba and 
urban teachers, respectively.  They were also integrated into the Coordinadora and helped to 
organize and carry out demonstrations during the series of protests.  They protested with anger 
against social consequences of neoliberalism policy and state-repression (Webber, 2011).  While 
Coordinadora was widely supported from middle and lower classes, another grassroot civil society 
group, Civic Committee primarily represented the business and political community of the city 
and was generally supported by the middle and upper classes (Woodhouse, 2003).   
The resistance to the concession was successful because of alliances between the 
Coordinadora and the Civil Committee which got widespread support among the urban population 
as well as rural population and campesinos.  During the initial stage of negotiation with the GOB, 
the alliance agreed on the following: 1) freezing tariffs at the pre-concession levels of November, 
1999; 2) the revision of the water law in order to respect the uses, customs, and traditional water 
rights of the rural population as well as of the urban water cooperatives; 3) the review and revision 
of the concession contract with AdT by a commission composed of representatives of government 
and civil society; 4) various measures to re-establish peace and stability in Cochabamba 
(Woodhouse, 2003).  However, the alliance started to unravel as the Coordinadora stood for 
cancellation of concession whereas the Civic Committee favored dialogue and a revision of the 
contract with the AdT (Democracy Center, 2003).  The Coordinadora viewed water as a social 
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good and attempted to prioritize the realization of a human right to water as a precondition for 
cost-recovery and economic development, whereas the Civic Committee viewed water as an 
economic good and thus valued economic principles in water management (The NewYorker, 
2002).  These contrasting views prove that two groups with different beliefs could not find a 
common ground and as a result they had publicly rejected each other as legitimate voices during 
the conflict.   
 
Strategy of Coordinadora and Civic Committee: Protest in late 1999 and early 2000 
that led to a policy change for the re-municipalization of the SEMAPA 
Despite the break-up of two coalitions between the Coordinadora and the Civic Committee, 
the most prominent character of these coalition groups in Cochabamba case was that the members 
of the groups came from grassroots.  At the early stage of forming these coalitions, international 
activists were not observed, indicating that the movement and protest led by the Coordinadora and 
the Civic Committee were initiated at the local level and their collective action got powerful 
enough to influence the government’s decision to turn over the SEMEPA to the municipal 
government again.  The emergence of protest and civil disobedience organized by such corporatists 
and proto-state actors in Cochabamba demonstrated that the absence of institutionalized avenues 
for political participation by the average citizens.  In Bolivia, the grassroots groups had maintained 
a monopoly on political representation of lower classes, workers, and indigenous groups until the 
1990s (The NewYorker, 2002).  As a result, disruptive protest and conflict organized by grassroots 
coalitions emerged as a tool of political communication which attempted to deliver the discontent 
and frustration of citizens to the government.  
41 
In the middle of conflict between the Coordinadora and the Civil Committee, the 
government of Bolivia displayed an inability to handle the polarized beliefs on water.  They started 
to exclusively negotiate only with the Civic Committee and withdrew the Coordinadora from 
negotiation, leaving the protest unheeded.  In response to the protest, Cochabamba municipal 
government agreed to meet the representatives of protestors, but the central government sent 
soldiers to interrupt the meeting (Contra Costa Times, 2000).  The central government promised 
to renegotiate the concession and amend the new water law but declined to reduce Cochabamba's 
water rates.  Unsatisfied with the government's response, protestors blockaded Cochabamba's 
plaza in February 2000 and the Bolivian government sent soldiers who used tear gas and bullets 
against the protestors (Contra Costa Times, 2000).  In early April 2000, protestors staged a strike 
again to demand the Bolivian government rescind the concession.  Soldiers and protestors fought 
in the streets.  As this trend continued, frustration with the negotiation process increased, 
engendering distrust among the already discontented public (Assies, 2003; Römgens, 2011).  
Violent clashes between the demonstrators and law enforcement resulted in 40 injuries, and five 
deaths, causing President Banzer to declare a "national state of emergency.”  This series of conflict 
between protestors and the government is called the “Cochabamba Water War.”  
After the Water War, the Coordinadora was getting popular as a symbol of democratic 
exercise in the global south, holding a referendum.  Ninety-six percent of voters demanded 
canceling the contract with the AdT.  This outcome, however, was not accepted by either the 
central government or the Civic committee, who blamed a lack of validity in the vote process 
(Assies, 2003).   This clearly proved that the GOB refused to accept the Coordinadora as an 
institutionalized representative of the citizens.  While the government dealt with protestors for 
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several rounds, the AdT was forced to leave Bolivia.  Consequently, the SEMAPA regained the 
control of Cochabamba's water.   
 
Strategy of the AdT: Arbitration pursued by the AdT in the World Bank's 
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes  
In 2000, the AdT pursued arbitration to recover US $25 million in the World Bank's 
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).   
Strategy of international CSOs against the AdT’s dispute: Solidarity actions against 
Bechtel 
Right after the dispute from the AdT, there were many international solidarity actions.  The 
Democracy Center, a US-based civil society organization, summarized the actions done by 
international organizations for Cochabamba-Bechtel case and the following contents in the Table 
5 are retrieved from their website (Democracy Center, 2006).   
 
Table 5. Solidarity actions conducted by international civil society groups 
• The Democracy Center documents Bechtel as the majority owner of the AdT   
• Email protest was sent by 500 people to Bechtel demanding the company’s withdrawal 
from Cochabamba  
• Solidarity protests performed in San Francisco at Bechtel headquarter   
• When Coordinadora hosted a conference entitled “Water: Globalization, Privatization, 
and the Search for Alternatives” in December 2000, a number of U.S./Canadian 
solidarity actors participated and declared the Cochabamba Declaration on the Right to 
Water   
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 Source: Democracy Center, 2006 
 
Bechtel ultimately dropped the case in 2006 in exchange for Bolivia absolving the AdT of 
any potential liability.  A settlement was reached between the Government of Bolivia and the AdT 
and stated that "the concession was terminated only because of the civil unrest and the state of 
emergency in Cochabamba and not because of any act done or not done by the international 
shareholders of the AdT" (Bechtel, 2006).  The protests, political venues and actions led by civil 
society organizations at both grassroots and international levels show that they influenced decision 
making in municipal water policy not only by shaping international and domestic discourse on a 
human right to water, but also by intervening in actual negotiations in the World Bank's 
International center for the Settlement of investment Disputes.   
 
External event: Shift of governing coalition and the 2009 Constitution amendment for 
long-term stability of the new policy 
Since 1985, the government of Bolivia had embraced the economic belief on water.  At 
that time, President Victor Pas Estenssoro’s (1985-1989) right-of-center government initiated the 
wave of privatization in Bolivia. Under the frame of ‘New Economic Policy’, the government 
started to deregulate and privatize state-owned enterprises including oil, gas, telecommunications, 
• In September 2002, an international citizens petition, signed by 300 organizations from 
43 countries, was filed with the World Bank demanding that the Bechtel-Bolivia case 
be opened to public scrutiny and participation, but the petition was rejected by the 
World Bank.  Between 2004-2005, more than 300 people sent emails to the 
headquarters of AdT, requesting they drop the case  
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airlines, power generation, and railroad companies over the following 20 years.  Cochabamba’s 
water privatization plan proceeded in 1999 when the central government of Hugo Banzer (1997-
2001) continued the deregulation policy and led nationwide privatization under international 
donors’ pressure to view water as a commodity.   
This policy based on economic belief faced challenges as the proto-state actors like 
Coordinadora and Civic Committee gained political popularity in the end of 1990s.  The protests 
against the AdT were inspired by a variety of justifications including regional pride, general anger 
at the government and the economic crisis, and rejection of the neoliberal economic models 
adopted in the national government’s policies.  With wide support from throughout Cochabamba's 
civil society organizations, the 2000 national water law exempted indigenous rural and urban water 
committees, cooperatives, and neighborhood associations from the requirement of holding a 
concession and eliminated the exclusivity clause granted to concessionaires in the 1999 law, 
recognizing the right of small groups to maintain their independence from such large-scale 
concessions (Kapoor, 2015).   
The 2009 new constitution under President Morales’ government enacted many 
progressive reforms toward a human right to water, and Bolivia has established a precedent by 
formally recognizing the delivery of basic services, along with participation and social control as 
fundamental rights.  Table 6 is the brief statement of the constitution regarding water management 
(Constitute project, 2009). 
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Table 6. Brief statement of 2009 Constitution on water management 
Article 16, I. Every person has the right to water and food. 
Article 20, III. Access to water and sewer systems are human rights, neither are the object of 
concession or privatization, and are subject to a regimen of licensing and registration, in 
accordance with the law. 
Article 373, I. Water constitutes a fundamental right for life, within the framework of the 
sovereignty of the people. The State shall promote the use and access to water on the basis of 
principles of solidarity, complementariness, reciprocity, equity, diversity, and sustainability. 
Article 374, The State shall protect and guarantee the priority use of water for life. It is the duty 
of the State to manage, regulate, protect, and plan the adequate and sustainable use of water 
resources, with social participation, guaranteeing access to water for all inhabitants. The law 
shall establish the conditions and limitations of all the uses. 
Article 375, I.  It is the duty of the State to develop plans for the use, conservation, management 
and sustainable exploitation of the river basins. II. The State shall regulate the management and 
sustainable administration of the water resources and the basins for irrigation, food security and 
basic services, respecting the uses and customs of the communities. 
Source: Constitute project, 2009 
 
The 2009 constitution also recognized the rights of the nations and rural native indigenous 
peoples under the Article 30 as shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7. Brief statement of 2009 Constitution on the rights of rural native indigenous 
people 
Article 30, 15. To be consulted by appropriate procedures, in particular through their 
institutions, each time legislative or administrative measures may be foreseen to affect them.  In 
this framework, the right to prior obligatory consultation by the State with respect to the 
exploitation of non-renewable natural resources in the territory they inhabit shall be respected 
and guaranteed, in good faith and upon agreement. 
Source: Constitute project, 2009 
 
Based on the constitutional reform, the Morales government started to record and enshrine 
ancestral water rights of indigenous and campesino families and communities under the framework 
of the irrigation law (Globe and Mail, 2006).  The new constitution brought funding and support 
from the central government and UN for drinking water and sanitation projects (The New 
Republic, 2018).  President Evo Morales, a president of Bolivia since 2006, successfully advocated 
a human right to water and sanitation at the United Nations, who declared these to be human rights 
in 2010.  He gained substantial financial support from the U.N., contributing to the great 
improvement of water service in Bolivia in general (The New Republic, 2018).  
 
New institutional arrangements to support public management after re-
municipalization 
Despite the great polarized groups in Cochabamba and challenges in SEMAPA 
management and regulation, the local government, SEMAPA, local citizens and international civil 
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society groups have attempted some new institutional arrangement to adopt more participatory and 
community-based approaches.    
1) A public-social company with a very high level of popular participation, including a 
popular assembly with elected delegates from all regions of the city, has been proposed and is in 
progress (McDonald et al., 2012; Upside Down World, 2008).  This experience had a considerable 
impact at the national level with the enactment of the New Constitution in February 2009.  
2) Agua Para Todos (Water for All), a consortium, was founded by combined efforts of 
the SEMAPA, a community-based Water Committee and an NGO, Pro-Habitat, with an objective 
to create community-owned secondary water distributions in poor peri-urban areas of 
Cochabamba.  As of 2005, Agua Para Todos had invested 1 million US dollars, a half of which 
came from community resource and the other half from the municipality.  The costs of installing 
community water pipes were met by the communities through a micro credit scheme, repayable 
within a year (IPS, 2005). The consortium won the 2005 SEED1 Award in Water, Sanitation & 
Health (WASH) section.  Though the consortium has been doing an innovative job, problems have 
remained with regard to continued population growth and industrialization, requiring vast 
quantities of water for continued human and industrial development. 
3) Association of community water systems of the poor, southern zone of the city (ASICA-
Sur) has secured financing from the EU to build water system in poor areas (McDonald, 2011) 
4) The 2009 Constitution also contained some reinforcement to safeguard water as a natural 
resource as shown in Table 8 (Constitute project, 2009).  
 
1 SEED is a global partnership for action on sustainable development and the green economy, was 
founded at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg by UN 
Environment, UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) and IUCN (International Union 
for Conservation of Nature) (UNO, 2002).  
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Table 8. Brief statement of 2009 Constitution on water conservation 
Article 108, To protect and defend the natural resources and to contribute to their sustainable 
use in order to preserve the rights of future generations.  
Article 124, The Bolivian who engages in the following acts commits the crime of treason 
against the country:  Violates the constitutional regime of natural resources. 
Article 380, I. The renewable natural resources shall be exploited in a sustainable way, 
respecting the characteristics and natural value of each ecosystem. 
Source: Constitute project, 2009 
 
In addition to the constitution that has promoted sustainable management of water resource, 
the Bolivian government also established ‘Law for the Rights of Mother Earth’ in 2010, the 
fundamental objective of which was to prescribe, uphold, and guarantee the co-existence and 
preservation of life.  This law aims to recognize that nature has the same equal rights as humans 
and these rights should be protected and defended in the same manner.  Table 9 is brief statement 
of the part in the law, the translated version of which was adopted from WPHNA website 
(WPHNA, 2014). 
 
Table 9. Brief statement of ‘Law for the Rights of Mother Earth’ 
Article 2. Principles: The binding principles that govern this law are…No commodification. For 
which life systems or processes that sustain them cannot be commodified, nor be part of 
anyone’s private property. 
Article 7. Rights of Mother Earth 
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The law enumerates seven specific rights to which Mother Earth and her constituent life systems, 
including human communities, are entitled to…water: It is the right of the preservation of the 
quality and composition of water to sustain life systems and their protection with regards to 
contamination, for renewal of the life of Mother Earth and all its components. 
Source: WPHNA, 2014 
 
The statement in the constitution does not necessarily lead the government to completion 
of water conservation in practice. As increasing plans of development and fracking in Bolivia 
evolve, concerns have been raised whether this law would be compatible with the plans.  The 
concern became real: the International Rights of Nature Tribunal reported the Bolivian government 
has violated the rights of Mother Earth and the collective and individual rights of the nations and 
indigenous peoples in TIPNIS case (Movement Rights, 2019).  In 2008, the government hired the 
Brazilian company OAS to build a highway that would divide the protected area of TIPNIS without 
carrying out a comprehensive environmental impact assessment.  The International Rights of 
Nature Tribunal analyzed that the case has caused deforestation and the expansion of coca leaf 
production, and affected biodiversity, causing the irreparable loss of natural beings (Movement 
Rights, 2019).  This incident points out that the implementations for nature conservation and 
participatory governance are still in progress, but not yet matured.  Nevertheless, expressing 
statements of water and nature conservation in the constitution could serve as the first step toward 
actual policy implantation.   
4-5) There have been some positive signs in SEMAPA management.  The SEMAPA 
started to allow freedom of information of its accounts and disclose its investment and revenue 
streams, with public hearings and direct public participation holding the agency to accountability 
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(SEMAPA, 2018).  In September 2011, the public servants of SEMAPA signed the “Political 
Manifesto Decolonization of the Public Ethics and Behaviour Revolution Servants and Public 
Servants of the Plurinational State of Bolivia to the Bolivian people”, denoting a commitment by 
the public sector to offer accountability (Future Policy, unknown).  In 2008, SEMAPA union voted 
for their new leadership who expressed their commitment to union democracy for the first time in 
over twenty-five years (Upside Down World, 2008).  
4-6) The Misicuni project was pursued by President Morales in order to provide water for 
hydropower generation and irrigation and was completed in 2017 (Hines, 2018).  The dam 
construction was financed by the Italian government, the Development Bank of Latin America 
(CAF), and the Inter-American Development Bank.  
 
5) Challenges to current water policy under public management 
5-1) Weak management capability of SEMAPA characterized by being not self-
sustainable 
Despite service and coverage improvement in general across Bolivia with the U.N.’s 
support under President Morales’s office2, currently there are still challenges to be addressed.  The 
biggest challenge is the unsustainable SEMAPA management system.  It has not been able to 
create profit after privatization and re-municipalization.  Their financial statements in 2015, 2016, 
2017, and 2018 available on their website disclose that their costs of service and management have 
exceeded their earning (SEMAPA, 2018), indicating the their service has not been self-sustainable.  
 
2 The Washwatch program reported that in Bolivia, 90-percent of the total population had access 
to "improved" water source and 50-percent of the total population had access to "improved" 
sanitation as of 2015 (WashWatch, 2015).   
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As a result, other international companies have been unwilling to give them more loans after AdT 
involuntarily left (The NY Times, 2005).   
The weak management capability of SEMAPA is also pointed out by Shultz during the 
interview.  He believes the actions done by grassroot and international CSOs were successful in 
terms of altering politics and igniting debate on water privatization around the world, but less 
successful in providing water services to all to ensure access to improved water resource (Shultz, 
Apr 29, 2019).  He said that there was a lot of interest and enthusiasm at the time of the water 
revolt, but it did not translate into ongoing citizen's involvement in policy making afterward.  He 
said if he could go back to the middle of the Water War, he would have to build the team that could 
help carry forward SEMAPA’s work better (Shultz, Apr 29, 2019).   
     
5-2) Weak regulatory system of the Super-Intendency of Water 
As mentioned earlier, the 1994 national water law established a Super-intendency of Water, 
SSSB, as a national regulation entity on water systems.  However, several researchers pointed out 
that the weak regulatory capacity of the SSSB, in the form of budget constraints and lack of trained 
human resources, hampered the effectiveness of SSSB intervention and restricted its capacity to 
carry out a public relations campaign about the terms of the concession (Global Water Report, 
2000b; Nickson et al., 2002).  In addition, the SSSB has not been politically independent from the 
Bolivian government, playing passive roles in presenting citizens’ needs especially during 
renegotiation of tariff setting; re-negotiation and tariff freezes after the Water War were agreed 
upon by the central government and the Civic Committee, the only civil society group that had an 
economic belief on water (Global Water Report, 2000b).  Critics say that the government-
appointed regulators in SSSB were largely ineffective in overseeing privatizations due to the 
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inherent tension between government and administrative oversight (Nickson et al., 2002) and left 
mass protestors and the government to negotiate by means of violence in Cochabamba.  This issue 
has not been addressed and seems to be immedicable until the policy stakeholders are able to 
provide sufficient resources and attention.     
 
5-3) Still polarized social values: Social Unrest in 2007 caused by multiple ethnicities 
and their contrasting interests in Cochabamba 
Top-down attempts to have citizens participate in policy making was implemented in 
Bolivia since its 1994 Law of Popular Participation.  Nevertheless, mechanisms implemented to 
institutionalize citizens’ participation has never been easy.  This is in part because of contrasting 
interests among polarized citizens from multiple ethnicities and business groups.  The 
Cochabamba Social Unrest that occurred in 2007 is a good example of the difficulty of integrating 
interest across a multiplicity of actors.  The Cochabamba Social Unrest was caused by the conflict 
between the supporters of the Governor of Cochabamba, Manfred Reyes Villa, and the supporters 
of the President Morales.  Manfred Reyes Villa was the first elected governor of the Department 
of Cochabamba from 2006-2008.  Evo Morales has been the first indigenous president since 2006.  
The governor's opposition to Morales' policies angered the president's supporters and, early in 
2007, demonstrations in Cochabamba escalated into violence.  Thousands of indigenous peasants 
and coca growers from rural areas converged on the city to express support for the presidents’ 
policy, indigenous political power, and a centralized state.  In response, thousands of middle and 
upper class whites and mestizos attempted to retake control of the city (Hines et al., 2009).  They 
sought to support traditional political parties and increase autonomy for regional departments in 
order to mitigate the influence of the indigenous political groups.  The social unrest resulted in a 
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mini-civil war, where 160 people got injured and three people were killed (Hines et al., 2009).  The 
conflict of multiple ethnicities and social groups in Cochabamba was a great barrier to 
implementing a mechanism of citizen’s participation in water governance because their policy core 
beliefs are very polarized, and policy-learning and shifts across coalitions that lead to integrated 
policy and planning are not likely to happen in such an extremely polarized environment.      
 
6) Conclusion 
First, the dynamic change of water policy in Cochabamba from privatization to re-
municipalization of SEMAPA confirms that water policies have been the results of powerful 
coalitions of policy stakeholders.  The World Bank suggested the privatization of SEMAPA to the 
central government through the conditionality of their relief loan and formed a coalition with 
President Banzer’s office and Cochabamba’s mayor to translate their neoliberal structural reform 
approach to the SEMAPA.  However, under lack of citizen’s consensus on the privatization, the 
rate hike caused by the Misicuni project, and a strong protest led by the opposing coalition of 
Coordinadora and Civil Committee resulted in the return of SEMAPA to public hands.  At the 
international level, individuals and international civil society organizations formed a coalition to 
demand the cancelation of Bechtel’s dispute to Bolivian government and practiced their resource 
of solidarity.  Bechtel finally dropped their case at the World Bank's International Center for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes.  The Cochabamba case confirms that local and international 
civil society organizations successfully translate their belief systems into actual policy by forming 
coalition with allies and by utilizing their political resources and venues.   
Second, Evo Morales, a coca growers’ leader who participated in the coalition of 
Coordinadora, became the president of Bolivia and the policy core belief of a human right to water 
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was reflected into the new Constitution enacted in 2009, which was a major external event to water 
policy subsystem in Cochabamba.  After the re-municipalization of SEMAPA, more participatory 
and community-based approaches have been applied in water management in Cochabamba by 
local water committees and international civil society organizations, indicating that new 
institutional arrangements to support their core belief of a human right to water are in progress.  
Third, despite general service improvement across the country under President Morales’ 
leadership, the capabilities of the regulation body and the SEMAPA are still questionable in that 
the SEMAPA has not been able to make profit after privatization and re-municipalization.  The 
2007 Social Unrest of Cochabamba, where very polarized groups of people with multiple 
ethnicities and interests violently crashed each other, implies that a participatory approach to 
promote policy learning across coalition and a strong consensus would be difficult to achieve in 
such an extremely polarized environment.       
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3.2. URUGUAY: A SMALL URBANIZED STATE WITH SUFFICIENT WATER 
SUPPLY 
Coalitions with the social belief in Uruguay used the 2004 national election and referendum 
as their strategies, contributing to re-municipalizing their water entity, OSE, and adding the values 
of a human right and environmental justice in their constitution.  With successful reform 
experience, the OSE is leading Public-Public Partnerships with other public water service entities 
in Latin America.  An interview with Terra Rafael, a professor at the University of the Republic 
of Uruguay, was conducted to help the understanding of the Uruguay water policy process.      
Source: Google Map 
  
Uruguay is the second richest country in terms of GDP per capita, after Chile, in South 
America and the second smallest country, after Suriname, in the continent with a population of 
Figure 6. Uruguay 
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about three million.   While its urbanization rate is over 95-percent as of 2018, one of the highest 
in the world, 93-percent of its territory is apt for agriculture (Index Mundi, 2018).  The Montevideo 
Waterworks, a British water company was nationalized in 1952 and its name was replaced with 
Obras Sanitarias del Estado (Sanitation Works of the State, OSE).  Since then, OSE has been 
publicly owned and operated to provide water service nationwide and sanitation everywhere 
except Montevideo.  Montevideo’s sanitation service has been under direct provision of the city 
whereas sanitation out of the city took place later and has since been under OSE management.  
With substantial development funds from international donors and public investment, OSE has 
achieved nearly 95-percent of the coverage rates for water supply during 1990’s (World Bank, 
2010).  Uruguay also possesses sufficient amount of ‘per capita renewable water’ resources and 
groundwater reserves (Index Mundi, 2014).   
 
1) Policy stakeholders and their policy core beliefs 
Similar to other cases in this study, the content analysis conducted for the Uruguay case 
shows that there is a variety of organizations participating in policy making.  Table 10 shows the 
classification of organizations and their core beliefs on water.  
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Table 10. Classification of organizations and their core beliefs on water in Uruguay case 
View on 
water 
Local CSOs International CSOs Public actors Private actors 
Economic 
good 
National Party 
Colorado party  
Asian Development Bank 
World Bank 
IMF 
  
EU-Mercosur  
Aguas de la Costa  
URAGUA 
Aguas de Bilbao 
Suez 
Development 
Bank of Latin 
America 
Social 
good 
CNDAV 
CDWS 
FFOSE 
Sustainable Uruguay-
Program 
Broad Front party, 
Red VIDA 
PIT-CNT 
FUCVAM (Federacion 
Uruguaya de 
Cooperativas de 
Vivienda por Ayuda 
Mutua) 
FEUU (Federación de 
Estudiantes-
Universitarios Uruguay) 
Casa Bertolt Brecht 
Public Services-
International 
Council of Canadians 
Public Citizen  
Consumer International 
Coordinadora 
Rel-UITA (International 
Union of Food, Agriculture, 
Hotel, Restaurant, Tobacco, 
and Allied Trades) 
IUF (International Union of 
Food, Agricultural, and 
Allied Workers)  
Polaris Institute 
Red VIDA 
German Heinrich Böll  
Panta Rhea Foundation 
 
DINAGUA 
COASAS 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Ecological 
good 
 REDES_AT  
Friends of the Earth –
International 
    
Sector     
Central Bank of 
Uruguay 
GOU 
Ministry of Public 
health 
OSE 
MVOTMA 
URSEA 
 
Source: own analysis 
 
Table 10 indicates that that there are numerous organizations who participate in the 
subsystem of Uruguay’s water policy, especially a large number of civil society organizations at 
local and international levels.  The key roles of the stakeholders and their policy core beliefs are 
discussed through this chapter. 
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2) Water policy subsystem 
Among many stakeholders, the content analysis of Uruguay case reveals civil society 
groups such as CNDAV and FFOSE earn high betweenness centrality, indicating that civil society 
groups played crucial roles in the decision-making on water policy as shown in Table 11.   
 
Table 11. Betweenness centrality of stakeholders in Uruguay water policy subsystem 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  Source: own analysis, using R software 
 
Figure 7 shows the key stakeholders and their interaction with other stakeholders within Uruguay’s 
water policy subsystem.  Note that red color indicates a civic space for participation and 
coordination among key stakeholders, which was created after the 2004 referendum. 
 
Key Stakeholder Betweenness 
centrality 
CNDAV 135.90000           
GOU 121.76667            
FFOSE 22.25000            
OSE 13.38333             
COASAS 7.80000             
URSEA 1.50000             
MVOTMA 0.90000 
DINAGUA 0.50000             
59 
 
Figure 7. Key stakeholders and their interactions with other stakeholders for Uruguay case 
Policy core beliefs: Brown represents the social belief; Blue represents administration belief; 
Yellow represents economic belief; Green represents ecological belief following Table 2; Venues 
for coordination and participatory spaces in red / nonprofit in circle; public in triangle; private in 
diamond; state-owned in square / Ties among stakeholders mean relationship as explained in Page 
16 
Source: own analysis using R software 
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Figure 7 shows that the local civil society organizations and political parties, though they hold 
different policy beliefs, interact under the CNDAV coalition.  This strong coalition made it 
possible to re-municipalize the OSE through the 2004 referendum and to declare a human right to 
water through a constitutional amendment.  The constitutional amendment leads to the creation of 
institutionalized spaces such as COASAS and DINAGUA for multiple stakeholders’ participation 
and coordination among them. Figure 8 shows the variables captured under the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework for Uruguay case. 
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Figure 8. Variables captured under the Advocacy Coalition Framework for Uruguay case 
Arrows indicate causal relationship between variables 
Source: own analysis, using AnyLogic software 
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3) Coalition of key stakeholders 
3-1) Coalition of President Lacalle’s office, the World Bank and the IMF 
Uruguay historically has had generous social program.  After the Paraguayan War (1856-
70), Batlle’s administration (1903-7, 1911-15) initiated a social welfare system codified in the 
Uruguayan constitution.  After Uruguay dictatorship (1973-85), which managed all state-owned 
enterprises, Uruguayan reform process was gradually started during the period of most intense 
reform in Latin America focusing on privatization and the dismantling of the monopolies 
previously managed by public enterprises in 1990s.  With the objective of generating greater 
competition and promoting private investment and technical progress, President Lacalle (1990-
1995) from a right wing-National party attempted to liberalize the economy and started to privatize 
state enterprises.  At that time, the World Bank and the IMF recommended the government to 
privatize part of the water services as a means of modernizing the sector by introducing 
competition (Santos et al., 2005).  Following this advice as well as growing pressure as a member 
of Mercosur3, a South American trade bloc aimed at creating a free-trade market among member 
countries, the government started to turn part of the water services over to two private water 
corporations (World Bank, 2010).  The first concession was granted in 1992 to the Aguas de la 
Costa, a subsidiary of Aguas de Barcelona (Suez) in the eastern zone of the department of 
Maldonado (IPS, 2006).  In 2000, OSE granted the second concession for the entire department of 
Maldonado to URAGUA, a subsidiary of Spanish water company Aguas de Bilboa (IPS, 2006).  
 
3 Mercosur has created the Southern Common Market which is one of the world’s leading 
economic blocs and fifth-largest economy.  Mercosur consists of five member countries – 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia and Uruguay – as well as six associate members – Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, and Suriname.  Mercosur serves as a customs union and free-
trade area aiming to integrate Latin America similar to the European Union.  
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Rafael noted that the department of Maldonado has been the wealthiest department in Uruguay 
with luxurious beach resorts and has needed to expand their water services for the increasing 
number of tourists and businesses (Rafael, Mar 28, 2019).  In addition, 14 small private water 
operators were granted the concession for water and sanitation services between 1992 and 2000 
(McDonald, 2011).   
Internal event: Failure of regulating private sector’s operation issues  
During 2001 and 2002, several incidents happened with respect to water quality and 
maintenance as well as water rates in the department of Maldonado.  For instance, Piriápolis, a 
city in Maldonado department under the provision of URAGUA, had a water main break, leaving 
the city without potable water for four days in January 2001 (Travis, 2011).  One month after the 
incident, residents of Maldonado were overcharged up to 300 percent on their bills and the 
URAGUA had to refund the overcharges following this violation of rules of concessions (LaRed 
21, 2002b).  Additionally, a sewer main break occurred in January 2002 in the city of Punta del 
Este in Maldonado and fecal E.coli bacteria was detected in the water supply (LaRed 21, 2002b).  
OSE issued a public health advisory to boil all water for the Maldonado residents and URAGUA 
got charged for their violation over sewage treatment guidelines that caused elevated level of fecal 
coliform bacteria by dumping partially-treated sewage into the water supply source of Punta del 
Este (LaRed 21, 2002b).  In addition to these water quality and maintenance issues that impacted 
public health, increasing water tariff triggered increased concerns toward the private companies.  
Since the private companies began to operate water service in the department of Maldonado in 
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1992, it was reported that water tariff has climbed to seven times4 the cost of water services in the 
rest of the country as of 2004 (IPS, 2004).   
3-2) Coalition of National Coalition in Defense of Water and Life (CNDAV) 
Despite these incidents, the Uruguayan government announced that they would grant water 
service of more cities to private companies in order to satisfy conditionalities of an IMF loan (IMF, 
2002).  It was at this time that the members of the OSE labor union (Federation of OSE Public 
Employees: FFOSE) and citizens formed the Comisión de Defensa de Agua y Saneamiento de 
Costa de Oro y Pando (CDASCOP), which became the nucleus of a nationwide civil society 
consortium, Comision Nacional en Defensa del Agua y de la Vida (National Coalition in Defence 
of Water and Life, CNDAV) in the following year (Business News Americas, 2003).  The CNDAV 
launched the “National Campaign in Defense of Water” with the objective of reforming the 
National Constitution through a public vote to recognize water as a human right.   
The CNDAV was founded in 2002 as a response to the central government who committed 
to further privatizing water services throughout the country (IMF, 2002).  The CNDAV has a 
special feature that it has a very heterogenous composition across social groups.  There were about 
30 organizations registered in CNDAV and Table 12 shows the list of organizations registered in 
the CNDAV (Travis, 2011).    
 
 
 
 
4 The researcher of this study could not confirm if this rate increase reported by IPS was adjusted 
by inflation.  
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Table 12. Organizations participating in CNDAV 
Organization Description 
Asociación de Remitentes Pensioners’ Association 
Casa Bertolt Brecht Progressive institute promoting German 
culture and language; provides institutional 
and financial support to Uruguayan causes 
Centro de Viticultores de Uruguay Winegrowers’ Association 
Comisión Barrial Zona Oeste Neighborhood Commission, eastern 
Maldonado 
Comisión de Defensa del Agua y Saneamiento 
de Costa de Oro y Pando (CDASCOP) 
Neighborhood organization in fast-growing 
province of Canelones; precursor to CNDAV 
Comisión Nacionalista en Defensa del Agua 
 
Convergencia Socialista 
 
Conosur  
Coordinadora del Barrio Sur y Adyacencias  
Consumidores del Uruguay Asociados Uruguay affiliate of Consumers International 
Docentes de la Facultad de Ciencias y Facultad 
de Ingeniería 
Faculty of Science and Engineering, 
University of the Republic of Uruguay 
ECOS Foundation promoting sustainable 
development located in Maldonado 
Federación de ANCAP Trade union of the state energy enterprise 
(fuels and combustibles) 
Frente Amplio - Encuentro Progresista - Nueva 
Mayoría 
Broad Front-Progressive Encounter-New 
Majority. Left-of-center ruling political party 
in Uruguay. 
FENAPES National Federation of Secondary School 
Teachers 
FEUU Federation of University Students 
FFOSE Federation of OSE Public Employees. WSS 
utility trade union 
FUCVAM Federation of Mutual Aid Housing 
Cooperatives. One of the largest and most 
influential urban social organizations and 
movement in Uruguay. 
Liga de Fomento de Manantiales Manantiales Promotion League. Civic 
organization in eastern Maldonado province, 
served by Aguas de la Costa. 
MADUR Uruguayan Movement of Agricultural 
Cultivators 
Movimiento por la Utopía 
 
Partido Nacional - Todo por el Pueblo National Party-- fraction 
Partido por la Seguridad Social Social Security Party 
Partido Verde Ecologista Green-Ecology Party 
PIT-CNT Uruguayan Trade Union Central Federation 
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Proyecto Solidario Cultural Sayago - SODEC 
 
REDES-AT (Amigos de la Tierra) Social Ecology Network-Friends of the Earth, 
Uruguay. 
UITA International Federation of Food, Tobacco, 
and allied workers—Latin American Regional 
Division 
Unión de Mujeres del Uruguay Women’s Union of Uruguay 
Uruguay Sustentable Sustainable Uruguay, environmental research 
organization working with REDES-AT and 
faculty of the University of the Republic 
Source: dissertation Karen Faye Travis, 2011. She noted that she accessed the information from 
FFOSE website in 2004 which is currently unavailable as of 2019. 
 
Table 12 illustrated that there are numerous organizations that participated in CNDAV.  
They represent diverse groups from environmental NGOs, trade unions, academics, businesses and 
consumers, neighborhood committees, and some public officials.  Consequently, their concerns 
covered a wide range of subjects including dissatisfaction with the performance and behavior of 
private concessions, exploitation of water resources, lack of transparency of public utility, and/or 
the pressure for new privatizations from IMF loan conditionalities, and further threats arising from 
trade liberalization negotiations in the WTO, the FTAA, the EU-Mercosur and other free trade and 
investment agreements (Dugard et al., 2012; REDES-AT, 2005).  However, they shared the 
common objectives under CNDAV to stop the privatization of water services, to guarantee a 
human right to water, and to advocate for the direct involvement of civil society, launching the 
National Campaign in Defense of Water and Life.  The heterogeneity of the group provided the 
campaign the unique aspect that it called for not only a human right to water, but also an emphasis 
on environmental issues, integrated management of water resources, and public participation.  
They also argued that water services must be kept outside of international trade agreements like 
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the WTO, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the Free Trade Agreement 
of the Americas (FTAA) (Travis, 2011).  
 
Strategy of CNDAV: 2004 national election and referendum  
The CNDAV decided to utilize the 2004 national election for the reform and started to 
obtain signatures for the water referendum to be included in the election.  The Uruguayan electoral 
system required at least 10-percent of voters to support the referendum of a citizen-initiated 
constitutional reform (Business News Americas, 2003).  Despite strong political opposition from 
the highly influential private water companies, bottled water companies, and conservative business 
sectors (McDonald, 2011), the CNDAV presented 283,000 signatures and satisfied the 
requirement for the water referendum (Business News Americas, 2003).  In the 2004 election, 60-
percent of Uruguayans voted for approval of a constitutional reform that defines water as a public 
good and guarantees civil society participation at every level of management of the country's water 
resources (El Paris, 2004).  After the reforms, the government changed the legal framework of 
water provision accordingly, which is discussed in the Institutional Arrangements section.  Private 
operators that had previously operated water and sanitation services before the referendum were 
either terminated or absorbed by OSE (Business News Americas, 2005).  Currently, nationwide 
water and sanitation services have been provided only by OSE and the Municipality of Montevideo 
(for sanitation). 
 
3-3) Coalition of the CNDAV and international civil society organizations 
The third coalition revealed by the content analysis in the Uruguay case is the coalition 
made by Uruguayan and international civil society organizations.  When CNDAV ran up to the 
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2004 election, there were many worldwide campaigns against water privatization following the 
wake of Cochabamba Water War led by international CSOs such as Public Citizen, Public Service 
International, Red VIDA and Council of Canadians (Barlow et al., 2017; Blouin-Genest et al., 
2018; Hall et al., 2004; Public Citizen, 2003a; Red Vida, 2003).  For example, Public Citizen, a 
US-based CSO, began a vast campaign under the title "Defend the Global Commons" and has 
called for collective control of water resources and actions against water commodification 
occurring around the world (Public Citizen, 2003a).  In addition, Red VIDA (La Red de Vigilancia 
Interamericana para la Defensa y Derecho al Agua) was formed in 2003 and launched a campaign 
calling for water as a public good and a fundamental human right and built a strong network in 
Latin America that helped the CNDAV’s social mobilization (Red Vida, 2003).  These 
international CSOs supported CNDAV by conducting research, publicizing information and media 
dissemination, running national and international anti-privatization campaigns, helping signature 
campaigns, publicity tours, networking, and garnering financial assistance to prevent 
commodification and privatization of water resource (Barlow et al., 2017; Blouin-Genest et al., 
2018; Hall et al., 2004). 
 
Shift of coalition: participation of opposing political parties in CNDAV 
Uruguay’s political party system had been historically bipartisan, dominated by the two 
traditional parties, the Colorado and the National Parties.  The Colorado party was traditionally 
associated with liberalism, secularism and urban business and worker interests, whereas the 
National party was historically conservative, defending the interests of landowners and the 
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Catholic Church (Travis, 2011).  Since the so-called ‘import-substituting industrialization model5’ 
got exhausted in 1960s, the Broad Front, a leftist-wing party, has grown (Bergara, 2004).  Both 
the traditional parties and the left wing, Broad Front, have been the central mechanisms of 
representation and expression of political interests. When President Lacalle from the National 
Party, attempted to privatize OSE in the early 1990s, the Broad Front discarded revolutionary 
rhetoric and become more moderate and more appealing to centrist voters (Luna, 2007).  In the 
1999 general election, the Broad Front obtained the largest share (40-percent) of the popular vote 
and won the most seats in the General Assembly (Bergara, 2004).  
In 2002 when the CNDAV was launched, the political climate was unfavorable to the 
reform.  A couple of political parties, including the Movement of Popular Participation 
(Movimiento por Participación Popular, which later became the largest part of the Broad Front) 
and the Progressive Alliance (Alianza Progresista), joined the coalition, but major political parties 
did not join and expressed some concerns about existing concessions and future foreign 
investment.  For example, the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista) and the Artiguista Fall (Partido 
Vertiente Artiguista) were concerned that the reform could increase uncertainty for foreign 
investors and would have a negative impact on foreign direct investment (LaRed 21, 2002a).  Even 
the Broad Front party joined the movement, but did not enter a formal alliance with the 
environmental groups and labor unions fighting water privatization until January 2003 (Van Dyke 
et al., 2010).  Then, the CNDAV announced that they had collected 100,000 signatures 
disapproving of outsourcing of OSE service and management to private companies, which clearly 
indicated that public opinion was turning against water privatization in January 2003 (McDonald, 
 
5 Import-substituting industrialization model aims to advocate economic independence by 
replacing foreign imports with domestic industrialization products. 
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2011).  During the 2004 election campaign, the Broad Front decided to include the water 
privatization issue in its election platform and simultaneously handed out leaflets on the negative 
consequences of water privatization as it passed out propaganda on its party’s slate of candidates 
for office (Van Dyke et al., 2010).  
In the beginning of CNDAV mobilization, ideological lines were not clear, particularly 
about the issue of cancellation of formerly-granted concessions.  The CNDAV’s proposal for the 
cancellation drew criticism from the ruling political parties, the Colorado and the National parties, 
which were concerned that the reform would authorize expropriation in the style of totalitarian 
regimes (LaRed 21, 2002a).  At the same time, several ministers assured that the reform would not 
and should not affect the concession because the reform would not have a retroactive effect (IPS, 
2004).  However, CNDAV continued asserting that the concessions would be voided by the 
constitutional amendment.  The continuing effort of CNDAV in domestic social mobilization and 
international support finally resulted in an unfavorable climate.  Under growing pressure from 
domestic and international organizations, the fractions of major political parties, the Colorado and 
National parties finally joined CNDAV before the water referendum (McDonald, 2011).  With 
broad political support, the Broad Front won the legislative and presidential elections as well as 
referendum in 2004.  After the referendum, it was reported that the private concessions were 
eventually canceled, not because of the constitutional amendment, but because of noncompliance 
such as work delays and nonpayment of agreed upon fees to the government by the private 
concessionaires (REDES-AT, 2004; Santos et al., 2005).  Therefore, there was no lawsuit related 
to the cancellation of the concessions between the government and concessionaires.   
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National water policy change and constitutional reform  
The Uruguayan institutional framework for water resources management had been the 
Water Code, Decree No 14.859 established in 1978.  The code granted sole ownership and 
managerial responsibilities of surface and ground water resources to national and municipal 
government, so they had managed water user fees, concessions, and permits.  At the same time, 
the Code recognized water property rights of registered private owners prior to the enactment of 
the Code.   
The reform campaign run by CNDAV in 2003 proposed amending Articles 47 of the 
Constitution to incorporate seven key principles (Balanyá, 2005): 
1)  water is a basic human right, not a “need” that can be satisfied by private corporations 
in exchange for profit, and therefore, social criteria prevail over economic criteria;  
2) water for human consumption is given priority over all other uses of water;  
3) corporations cannot pump water and export it without limits, either as bottled or bulk 
water;  
4) a majority approval in parliament is required to provide water to other countries facing 
water shortages, for solidarity reasons;  
5) private operation of water delivery and sanitation services are illegal, and can only be 
provided directly by state or government entities;  
6) the participation of consumers, communities and civil society in all stages of water 
management is required in order to improve transparency of decision-making against 
corruption of public utilities; 
7) all water resources must be managed in a sustainable way, which emphasizes water 
conservation and the prevention of water contamination. 
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This proposal was reflected in the outcome text of the constitutional amendments as shown in 
Table 13 (Constitute project, 2012). 
 
Table 13. Brief statement of the 2004 constitutional amendments 
Article 47  
The protection of the environment is of general interest. Persons must abstain from any act that 
causes grave depredation, destruction or contamination to the environment. The law shall 
regulate this provision and may provide sanctions for transgressors.  
Water is a natural resource essential for life. 
The access to potable water and the access to sanitation, constitute fundamental 
human rights. 
1. The national policy concerning water and sanitation shall be based on: 
     a. the ordering of the territory, conservation and protection of the Environment and the 
restoration of nature. 
   b. the sustainable management, in solidarity with the future generations, of the hydro resources 
and the preservation of the hydrological cycle which constitutes [a] matter of public interest. 
The users and the civil society, shall participate in all instances of planning, management and 
control of hydro resources; establishing the hydrological basins [cuencas] as basic unities. 
    c. the establishment of priorities for the use of water by regions, basins, or parts of them, 
having the first priority [be] the provision of potable water to the population. 
   d. the principle that the delivery [prestación] of the services of potable water and sanitation, 
must have preference for reasons of social order over the economic order. 
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Any authorization, concession or permission that in any manner infringes the provisions 
above[,] will be considered of no effect.  
2. The surface waters, as well as the subterranean [waters], with the exception of rain water, 
composing a hydrological cycle, constitute a unitary resource, subordinate to the general 
interest, that forms part of the public state domain, as public hydraulic domain. 
3. The public service of sanitation, and the public service of the provision of water for the human 
consumer will be provided exclusively and directly by state juridical persons. 
4. The law, by three-fifths of the votes of the total of the members of each Chamber, can 
authorize the supply of water, to another country, when such [country] encounters [the] inability 
to provide it[,] and for reasons of solidarity. 
Source: Constitute Project, 2012 
 
4) Policy-oriented learning for new institutional arrangements 
4-1) Organizational reforms to strengthen regulating entity, coordination among 
different levels and jurisdictions of governments, and civic space 
Following to the 2004 constitutional reform, organizational reform was conducted as well.  
To avoid fragmented authorities of water management, the central government created the 
National Directorate for Water and the Sewage System (DINASA, currently DINAGUA) as a 
coordination structure under Ministry of Housing, Land Management and Environment 
(MVOTMA) in 2007.  The MVOTMA has responsibility for any subjects related to housing, 
territorial planning, environment, water, and climate change in the state.  Under the MVOTMA, 
DINASA has played the roles in granting rights of water use, approving hydraulic resources which 
was previously under the domain of the Ministry of Transport, and formulating national water and 
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sanitation policies, and contemplating the participation of the various actors (MVOTMA, 2007).  
They also have proposed application of sanctions, arbitrated conciliation measures between users, 
registered the rights in the Public Water Registry, and carried the inventory of water resources. 
Above all, DINASA facilitates coordination of different departments of governments for water 
related-issues.  
In addition to DINASA, the Uruguayan government created a civic space, COASAS 
(Comisión Asesora de Agua y Saneamiento) under MVOTMA, which is a regional advisory 
commission on water and sanitation.  The objective of COASAS has been to open social control 
and citizen participation in the planning, management and control of national water and sanitation 
policies.  The members of COASAS have included CSOs, consumer groups, Unidad Reguladora 
de Servicios de Energía y Agua (URSEA, a regulatory unit), the University of the Republic 
(UDELARR), the executive branches from National Congress of Mayors and the management of 
OSE (Travis, 2011).  
The formations of DINASA and COASAS are seen to be an attempt of the government to 
address a wider array of public goals beyond cost efficiency concerns and to ensure efficiency, 
coordination and stability in public service delivery by balancing citizen, labor and community 
interests.  Similar efforts have been observed and reported in municipalities in other countries (Bel 
et al., 2018). 
 
4-2) Environmental Justice: Environmentally sustainable provision required in 
Constitution 
The Uruguayan water reform was one of the first instances where the requirement for 
environmentally sustainable provision was incorporated in a constitution.  As discussed 
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previously, apart from the considerations on a human right to water, public provision, and 
participation of CSOs, the CNDAV campaign also called for environmental justice by addressing 
the need of preserving and protecting aquifer for water as a public good.  The frame of 
“environmental justice” was suggested by a member of CNDAV, REDES-AT (Friends of the 
Earth-Uruguay), the Uruguayan affiliate of Friends of the Earth-International.  They believe the 
current environmental crisis has been largely the result of the concentration of resources and 
decision-making in the hands of corporate actors (Friends of the Earth-International, 2010).  In 
their view, the poor had to bear the heaviest burden of environmental degradation and pollution, 
indicating that the human right and the protection of the environment are inseparable.  In the same 
manner, they also asserted that water privatization without strong regulation would cause corporate 
and state malfeasance against the natural environment. The REDES-AT has been also actively 
participating in Sustainable Uruguay Program, food sovereignty and trade and investments issues 
as well.  Their integrated approach to the water privatization issue with environmental, 
socioeconomic, political, and cultural standpoint successfully created the linkage between social 
inequity and ecology, called the “social-ecological perspective”(REDES-AT, 2004).   
Responding to their concern on environmental justice, the government implemented 
National Social Emergency Assistance Plan which targeted 10-percent of households living in 
extreme poverty and attempted to mitigate the potential negative impact of the Increasing Block 
Tariff that might cause severe burden on the poor households consuming high volume of water 
(Spronk et al., 2014a).  With the assistance of the program, the poor households have paid roughly 
US $2-3 per month regardless of their water consumption while average household pays US $20 
dollars for water per month.  Another effort of the government in achieving environmental justice 
was to require a sustainable plan and implement the control and compliance for responsible use 
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and management through amended Irrigation Law and the National Water Plan launched in 2016 
(Bortagaray et al., 2017).  
 
4-3) Transitory provision for compensation 
In addition to a human right to water, public provision, social inclusion, and environmental 
sustainability, “transitory and special provision” was another unique addition to the Uruguayan 
constitutional reform.  The amendment stated if the concessions were cancelled, the private 
concessionaires would receive only reimbursement on unamortized investments, opposed to 
compensation for lost future earnings (Constitute project, 2012).  After the Cochabamba’s water 
conflict where Bechtel filed a US $50 million claim against the Bolivian government in the World 
Bank’s ICSID to recover sunk investments as well as lost future profits, the Uruguayan 
government learned the lesson and attempted to avoid potential lawsuits from private 
concessionaires by adding the provision.  This is clear evidence that policy-learning occurs not 
only within the Uruguayans’ water policy subsystem, but also from out of the subsystem.  
 
4-4) Raising capital investment by the OSE based on high creditworthiness 
Even though the amended constitutions still leave a possibility for municipal authorities to 
create an opportunity for private sector participation under public provision, Rafael assures that 
the current political landscape and social sensitivities make any attempt of private sector 
participation hopeless and therefore Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) is politically inviable in 
Uruguay water management (Rafael, Mar 28, 2019).  To raise financing from the domestic capital 
market, the OSE estimated that they needed $100 million annually in investments to achieve 
universal access by 2020 and launched a 22 year-bond program in 2017 (World Bank, 2019).  
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Thanks to the OSE’s favorable credit rating, the bonds were fully subscribed mainly by local 
pension funds.  The World Bank, who has economic belief on water and encourage the PPPs model 
for water sector reform, acknowledges that the reforms in water sector in Uruguay has been 
successful (World Bank, 2014; 2019).     
 
4-4) Alternatives to Public-Private Partnerships: Public-Public Partnerships to build 
international solidarity 
The OSE is currently a leader in initiating Public-Public partnerships (PuPs) in the region.  
The PuPs between OSE and FFOSE from Uruguay and many cities in Peru, Bolivia, Columbia, 
Paraguay and Ecuador have been in progress.  Madeline Baer points out that while there is little 
public information about the details of these partnerships or their outcomes yet, PuPs are an 
integral part of a larger OSE strategy of building international solidarity among public water 
utilities (Baer, 2017).  He notes that the OSE became a member of GWOPA (Global Water 
Operators' Partnership Alliance), the Platform for Public Community Partnerships of the 
Americas, and ALOAS (Latin American Association of Water and Sanitation Operators) and have 
been offering expertise through partnerships that offer a low-cost way to transfer technological 
solutions to struggling water operators.  To do this job, the OSE created an office for developing 
PuPs called the Office of Cooperation and Solidarity, National and International (Baer, 2017).  
This attempt can be seen that stakeholders expand their previous subsystem to global level to 
expand their leverage and resources.  
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5) Challenges to current water policy under public management 
5-1) Impact of the civic space 
The COASAS has been the space for citizen participation in water policy making.  It has 
had meetings approximately five times a year and the CNDAV has actively participated in the 
institutionalized space in COASAS (Travis, 2011).  However, Rafael questioned the efficacy of 
the COASAS.  He said the COASAS has been played as “a high-level consulting body integrated 
by a large number of institutions representing different actors.  But in practice, it plays a very 
minor role and is only a symbolic body” (Rafael, Mar 28, 2019).  He explained that “the 
referendum and associated legislation opened up the possibility of the participation of civil society, 
but decisions are not binding" (Rafael, Mar 28, 2019).  This indicates that COASAS initiated an 
instrumental mechanism of citizen’s participation, but direct public participation in decision-
making, as opposed to the procedures of representative democracy, is relatively new and the impact 
of the COASAS on policy making and implementation is unclear at this point.   
 
5-2) Relatively new regulation entity for increasing challenges  
Rafael comments that the most difficult challenge of Uruguayan water management system 
is to improve and maintain water quality at the water source as pollution and eutrophication have 
occurred (Rafael, Mar 28, 2019).  The challenges are connected to land use, and therefore to 
regulate and monitor land use is another challenge.  He thinks that URSEA (Unidad Reguladora 
de Servicios de Energia y Agua), a regulatory entity created in 2002 to complement the policy of 
private sector participation, possesses the good level of enforcement as it enforces only a few 
sectors: water, fuel and energy that are mostly under public provision now (Rafael, Mar 28, 2019).  
On the other hand, he argues that DINAGUA, a relatively new regulatory entity created in 2005 
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to govern national-level water body is slowly becoming stronger, but it has more challenges to 
regulate the loss of water and biodiversity, degradation of the soil and habitats, and the 
deterioration of ecosystems arising from forestry and mining industries (Rafael, Mar 28, 2019).  
 
6) Conclusions  
First, similar to the Cochabamba case, the dynamic change of water policy in Uruguay 
from privatization to re-municipalization of OSE confirms that the water policies have been the 
results of powerful coalitions of policy stakeholders.  A grassroot civil society consortium, 
CNDAV, with strong support from international CSO’s, successfully campaigned for the water 
referendum and its outcome has resulted in the constitution amendments that declared four 
important provisions in water policy: 1) a human right to water; 2) public provision; 3) the 
participation of consumers, communities and civil society in all stages of water management; 4) 
an emphasis on water conservation and environmental justice.  The amended constitution has been 
implemented through the elaboration of the law and its regulation shared with the national 
government, which guarantees the necessary participation of the social entities and local 
communities through institutionalized structures.  
Second, the inclusion of environmental and social/human rights in Article 47 of the new 
constitution reflects the conjoint emphasis on environmental justice placed by the CSOs with 
ecological belief that formed the nucleus of the CNDAV.  This indicates that two different policy 
core beliefs, economic and social beliefs in this study, can combine and make a synergistic impact 
on their leverage. The inclusion of transitory and special provision reflected the leadership’s 
integration into activist transnational networks fighting not only water privatization, but also 
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neoliberal trade and investment regimes.  The case of Uruguay water policy shows that the decision 
of re-municipalization in water sector influences approaches to other policy subsystems.   
Third, the OSE, based on successful reform, raised sufficient capital investment fund by 
launching a bond and the bond was consumed mostly by domestic companies.  Uruguayan’s re-
municipalization experience in water sector has spurred similar efforts in Latin America.  The OSE 
is a leader in initiating PuPs in Latin Americas and PuPs are integral parts of a larger OSE strategy 
of building international solidarity among public water utilities.  This is an example that 
international civil society and other public stakeholders who are previously outside of domestic 
policy subsystem starts to get involved in domestic policy subsystem.  Stakeholders attempt to 
maximize their resource and leverage by reaching out stakeholders outside of their domestic policy 
subsystem.  In sum, the Uruguayan case has an instrumental value for challenging discourse of 
private sector participation, especially pursued by international donors.    
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3.3 JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA: A CITY WITH HISTORICAL INEQUALITY 
AND LIMITED WATER SUPPLY AND FINANCIAL CAPABILITY 
Johannesburg created a corporation unit, Johannesburg Water, and granted it to private 
concessionaire, seeking increased efficiency and the transformation of a nonpayment culture left 
over from the Apartheid era. The government has implemented the Free Basic Water policy, the 
Increasing Block Tariff, and the Prepaid Meter to address historical inequality in water service 
under limited financial capacity.  The researcher of this study officially requested an interview to 
the Department of Water and Sanitation in Johannesburg and Cape Town.  The staff in 
Johannesburg did not reply.  The staff in Cape Town asked me to get a permission from the 
department authority and the department approved the interview after reviewing my official 
application.  The staff in Cape Town asked administrative staff who would be able to answer to 
my interview questions with better knowledges but failed to get them.  My impression is that the 
interview questions are difficult for administrative staff to answer.  Instead of answering to 
personal interview, they provided organizational reports for some interview questions, which are 
cited throughout this chapter.   
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Source Google Map 
 
Johannesburg is the biggest city in South Africa with a population of four million as of 
2015; it is located in the center of the country (Statistics South Africa, 2019).  South Africa has 
experienced the effects of the forced inequalities and wide-spread poverty that the apartheid system 
introduced.  Inequalities have been particularly evident in the quality of water services provided 
to different areas, which are for the most part still defined by race (Kotzé et al., 2011).  With the 
end of apartheid and the beginning of democracy in 1994, the new government prioritized the 
redress of inequalities and sought to better the lives of the poor by providing them with improved 
public services including water supply (Hoogeveen et al., 2006).  At that time, approximately 37 
Figure 9. Johannesburg in South Africa 
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percent of South Africa's population, 80 percent of whom lived in rural areas, lacked access to 
basic water supplies (Hoogeveen et al., 2006).   
 
External event: 1996 Constitution under post-apartheid government 
Unlike the Cochabamba or Uruguay cases, where international donors initiated the 
conversation of water privatization, the change in water management policy in Johannesburg was 
initiated at the national level by an external event, specifically the amendment of the South African 
Constitution under the post-apartheid government.  The Constitution of South Africa, amended in 
1996, recognized past injustices caused during the apartheid era and the need to establish a society 
based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights, including the right to 
water.  Table 14 is the brief statement of the part of constitution related to water management 
(South Africa Government, 1997a).   
 
Table 14. Brief statement of 1996 Constitution related to water management 
Article 24: Everyone has a right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-
being 
Article 27, 1: Everyone has the right to have access to…sufficient food and water and …Social 
security, including….appropriate social assistance. 
Article 27, 2: The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realization of these rights. 
Source: South Africa government website, 1997  
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The right to have access to sufficient water in South Africa’s Constitution was implemented 
to address inequality and wide-spread poverty the apartheid system had introduced.  The 
Constitution assigned duties to both central and local governments to protect and fulfill the right 
with reasonable laws and measures.  The recognition of the right was translated into new laws, so 
that the right obligations could be enforceable by the courts.   
In line with these constitutional mandates, relevant departments of the state, namely the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, the Department of Provincial and Local Government 
and other provincial local government departments, have developed legislative and other measures 
towards the progressive realization of the right to have access to sufficient water (South Africa 
Human Rights Commission, 2000), resulting in the establishment of two acts dealing with water 
governance in South Africa: the 1998 National Water Act (NWA) and the 1997 Water Services 
Act (WSA).  The fundamental principles of the NWA seem very progressive because the NWA 
abolishes the concept of riparian rights which allocates water rights only to land-owners and 
consequently excludes the vast majority of people.  The NWA also appoints the government as the 
public trustee of the nation’s water resources so as to ensure the sustainable and equitable use, 
management and conservation of water resources (South African Government, 1998).  
Additionally, the NWA codifies the constitutional right of access to basic water and sanitation and 
prioritizes socio-economic needs including the right of access to sufficient water (South Africa 
Government, 1997b).  Under the NWA, the right of access to sufficient water does not mean that 
the state provides water freely, but that it has an obligation to create “reasonable” mechanisms that 
enable people to have access to “sufficient” water.  The definitions of the two terms, “reasonable” 
and “sufficient” are not clear under the NWA and have caused conflicts among different groups 
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of people who argued over these two terms.  These conflicts are explained in later sections of this 
chapter.   
In addition to the National Water Act, the 1997 Water Service Act (WSA) has shifted 
emphasis from supply management to demand management as an approach to water management 
and seeks to conserve the nation’s water resources by lessening demand through pricing 
mechanisms and other methods to reduce non-revenue water (South Africa Human Rights 
Commission, 2000).  To do so, the WSA has implemented typical provisions of neo-liberal 
approaches, which undermine the overall aims of the legislation, such as of decentralization in 
setting up the duties of the central and municipal governments and water boards, cost recovery 
under the Norms and Standard for Tariff section, and privatization under the Contracts and Joint 
Ventures with Water Services Providers section (South Africa Government, 1997b).  Note that 
these neo-liberal provisions were implemented under limited profit and surplus making.  The WSA 
has addressed that the water services should be provided on an efficient, equitable, cost-effective 
and sustainable basis without profit and surplus.  Table 15 is the brief statement of the legislation 
with respect to neo-liberal provisions under the WSA (South Africa Government, 1997b).  
 
 
Table 15. Brief statement of neoliberal provisions under the Water Service Act 
Acknowledging: that although municipalities have authority to administer water supply services 
and sanitation services, all spheres of Government have a duty, within the limits of physical and 
financial feasibility, to work towards this objective. 
Article 10, 1: …place limitations on surplus or profit… the recovery of costs reasonably 
associated with providing the water services. 
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Article 19: a water services authority may only enter into a contract with a private sector after 
it has considered all known public sector water services providers which are willing and able to 
perform the relevant functions… a joint venture with another water services institution other 
than a public sector water services institution which will provide services within the joint 
venture at cost and without profit. 
Source: South Africa government website, 1997 
 
Since the state started to implement the neo-liberal provisions, several groups that possess different 
beliefs on water and perspectives on the provisions started to rise in the water management policy 
subsystem in Johannesburg. 
 
1) Policy stakeholders and their policy core beliefs 
Table 16 shows the list of organizations and their core belief on water identified by the 
content analysis of this study.  
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Table 16. Classification of organizations and their core beliefs on water in Johannesburg 
case 
View on 
water 
Local CSOs International CSOs Public actors Private actors 
Economic 
good 
Business Leadership South 
Africa  
Roundabout Water Solution 
ANC 
World Bank, IMF  Municipal 
Infrastructure 
Investment 
Suez 
Vivendi 
JOWAM 
Social good SA Coalition Against Water 
Privatization (CAWP) 
Anti-Privatization Forum 
(APF) 
Anti-Eviction Campaign 
SA Municipal Workers’ 
Union (SAMWU) 
Congress of SA Trade 
Unions (COSATU) 
Social and Environmental 
Movements 
African Ministers Council 
on Water 
Ghana National Coalition 
Against the Privatization 
of Water 
Concerned Citizens Forum 
in Durban 
Public Service 
International 
Alternative Information 
and Development Centre 
Public Citizen 
50 Years is enough 
Polaris Institute 
Council of Canadians 
High Court 
Supreme Court 
Constitutional Court 
 
Ecological 
good 
SA Water Caucus 
Environmental Monitoring 
Group 
Operation Hydrate 
Mvula Trust 
World Wide Fund 
Wildlife and Environment 
Society of South Africa 
Earth life Africa 
Global Water Partnership 
Catchment 
Management 
Agencies 
 
Sector Water Institute of Southern 
Africa 
Water Research 
Commission 
World Health Organization  
EU  
City government 
Department of Water 
Affairs  
Water Research 
Commission  
Department of 
Cooperative 
Governance, 
Traditional Affairs 
Rand Water  
Johannesburg 
Water 
Development 
Bank of 
Southern 
Africa  
Purple represents ‘self-contradiction’ group described in Page 93. 
Pink represents ‘corporation’ group described in Page 93. 
Source: own analysis 
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Similar to the Cochabamba and Uruguay cases, the content analysis revealed that a number of 
organizations participated directly and indirectly in policy subsystem for the Johannesburg case.  
The prominent group is civil society organizations at local and international levels which have the 
ecological belief.  They have been working for water conservation and demand control and have 
actively participated in development plans led by the government.  Another prominent group is 
the courts.  Since the government implements contradicting policies, Free Basic Water and Prepaid 
Meter, which are based on the social and economic beliefs, respectively, courts at different levels 
appeared significantly in media report to respond to citizens’ claims.  The meanings of ‘self-
contradiction’ and ‘corporation’ groups (marked in purple and pink, respectively) are explained in 
Section 3) Coalition of key stakeholders. 
 
2) Water policy subsystem of Johannesburg 
Among many stakeholders, the content analysis of Johannesburg case reveals that public 
governmental actors, such as the city of Johannesburg and the judicial courts, earn high 
betweenness centrality as shown in Table 17.  It indicates that the governmental actors participated 
most actively in decision-making and its implementation dialogue.  
 
Table 17. Betweenness centrality of stakeholders in Johannesburg water policy subsystem 
Key Stakeholder Betweenness 
centrality 
CityGov 65.6666667           
Catchment Agency 15.0000000            
Joburgh Water 7.1666667            
Cosatu 5.5000000            
Constitutional Court 5.0000000            
High court 5.0000000 
Supreme Court 5.0000000            
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                                  Source: own analysis, using R software 
 
Figure 10 features the key organizations which have directly/indirectly participated in the water 
management policy subsystem in Johannesburg case. 
AntiPF             2.5000000            
Coalition Against 
WP 
2.5000000            
RandWater 2.5000000            
ANC 2.3333333            
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Figure 10. Key stakeholders and their network with other stakeholders within Johannesburg 
water policy subsystem 
Policy core beliefs:  Brown represents the social belief; Blue represents administration belief; 
Yellow represents economic belief; Green represents ecological belief following Table 2; 
Governmental units and juridical courts in purple (violet); Corporation units in pink / nonprofit in 
circle; public in triangle; private in diamond; state-owned in square / Ties among stakeholders 
mean relationship as explained in Page 16 
Source: own analysis, using R software 
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Figure 10 reveals that interactions among key stakeholders in Johannesburg’s water policy 
subsystem is interesting in that the government seems to interact harmoniously with multiple 
groups with different beliefs.  Under the amended constitution, the governmental actors (marked 
in purple) acknowledge the responsibility of the state as a water provider and apply neoliberal 
approaches under the objective of cost recovery.  They also create corporation entities such as the 
Rand Water and the Johannesburg Water (marked in pink) which are owned by the government 
but operated under private business law.  The institutional arrangements to support a human right 
to water and cost-recovery will be explained through this chapter.  Figure 11 shows the variables 
captured under the Advocacy Coalition Framework for the Johannesburg case. 
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Figure 11. Variables captured under the Advocacy Coalition Framework for Johannesburg case 
Arrows indicate causal relationship between variables 
Source: own analysis, using AnyLogic software
93 
3) Coalition of key stakeholders 
3-1) Introduction of ‘self-contradiction’ and ‘corporation’ groups 
Self-contradiction group - the state and city government under National Water Act 
as well as the influence of neoliberalism: Under the National Water Act that requires 
governments at all levels to do reasonable actions to provide sufficient water to citizens, the state 
government and the city government have implemented two provisions that seem to contradict 
each other: the Free Basic Water policy, originating from the social belief,  and the Prepaid Water 
Meter, originating from the economic belief.  The two contradicting, but co-existent, policies in 
the water management subsystem of the Johannesburg case prove that the policy core beliefs that 
are held by different coalitions can be implemented compatibly under the goal of achieving a 
human right to water and cost-recovery, marking the governmental actors in purple color in Figure 
10.    
Corporation group – “not for profit” state-owned corporations under private 
business law: Another group arising from the Johannesburg water management policy subsystem 
is the group of corporations such as the Johannesburg Water and Rand Water that are owned by 
the government and operated under private business law.  The background of creating these 
corporations involves strong demands for local government reform and expanded services in the 
post-apartheid era.  During 1995-2000, the drive of private sector participation was very strong in 
South Africa under the climate of local government transformation and municipal amalgamation 
of defunct black local authorities into white local authority administrations (Smith, 2006).  The 
private sector participation was introduced by two national-level lending institutions, the 
Development Bank of South Africa and the Municipal Infrastructure Investment Unit, and was 
supported by a leading political party, African National Congress (ANC).  They introduced the 
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private sector participation as a solution to the financial crisis of local authorities who were trying 
to rapidly expand services to previously excluded areas.  As a result, Cape Town, Durban and 
Johannesburg, the three largest metropolitan areas in the state, started corporatization of their water 
service entities.   
In doing so, the city of Johannesburg created Johannesburg Water, a fully corporatized 
entity operating under private business law in 2001, and awarded the management of Johannesburg 
Water to JOWAM, a consortium led by the Suez, with the five-year mandate of improving 
financial and operational performances. (Beck et al., 2016).  During the concession, the city 
remained the owner of Johannesburg Water, while delegating its shareholder responsibilities to an 
appointed board of directors.  The Contract Management Unit in the city government was created 
to oversee the service delivery standards of Johannesburg Water.  In addition to the objective of 
gaining efficiency, another purpose of introducing the corporatization model as a new institutional 
model of water service was to transform the non-payment culture to publicly owned utilities that 
became prevalent during the Apartheid era.  Laila Smith, a director of Research and Evaluation at 
Contract Management Unit reported that “massive state bureaucracy implementing inequitable 
approach to service delivery was highly inefficient and difficult to maintain due to growing civic 
unrest, prompting a decline in revenues from state-owned enterprises.” (Smith, 2006).  The 
contract ended after 5 years and was not renewed, indicating that the private concession of the 
Johannesburg Water was implemented for short-term as a turning point to increase efficiency gain 
and reform non-payment culture in Apartheid era.     
In addition to Johannesburg Water, several private regional water boards, such as Rand 
Water, were created.  They are owned by the government but operate dams and manage bulk water 
supply and wastewater infrastructure under the private business law.  The special feature of these 
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corporations is that they are expressly “not for profit” organizations, with their profit being 
reinvested in the company’s infrastructure and development projects.  This feature is clearly in 
contrast to other private companies which work to profit shareholders, marking the Rand Water 
and the Johannesburg Water in distinct pink color in Figure 10. 
 
3-2) Coalition of organizations with the ecological belief  
The content analysis reveals that there are good numbers of CSOs participating in the 
discourse of water policy in Johannesburg.  Especially, CSOs with ecological belief have claimed 
themselves as “dripping tap watchers” (e.g., South Africa Water Caucus, Mvula Trust) and have 
been seeking environmental justice and ecological sustainability, attempting to provide an 
alternative to water use by encouraging water conservation and efficient water management.  The 
Mvula Trust, for example, was established before 1994 through cooperation between the 
government of South Africa, the democratic movement, and the European Union (EU), to promote 
the delivery of water and sanitation services on the principle of community-led development (Beck 
et al., 2016).  It also contributed to forming water committees in historically marginalized 
communities and a wide range of donors including EU were attracted by the rapid roll-out, as well 
as the commitment to community-led development (Beck et al., 2016).   
 
3-3) Coalition of organizations with the social belief 
In addition to CSOs with ecological belief, social movement CSOs with social belief at 
grassroot and international levels were observed.  At the grassroot level, Anti-privatization Forum 
and Coalition Against Water Privatization, which were formed by Johannesburg-based political 
activists, students, unionists and community organizations, have become active in response to the 
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impact of the government’s neo-liberal inspired privatization policy (McKinley, 2005).  In their 
view, privatization implies the anticipation of commercial orientation of the city of Johannesburg 
in transferring its responsibility of delivering basic services to citizens.  Moreover, they 
consistently criticized the government’s water policy as “neoliberal”, and its approach to tariffs as 
“commodification” and “preparation for privatization” (McKinley, 2005).  They also have 
challenged the policy of the city of Johannesburg in setting the level of free basic water at 6 kl per 
household per month.  They argued that an allocation based on the number of people in a household 
would be administratively complex and open to abuse as lower income household tend to have 
more family members.  In their progressive point of view, an optimal strategy would provide a 
larger free lifeline tariff, ideally on a per capita basis, not a per household basis, and then rise in a 
concave manner to penalize luxury consumption (Public Citizen, 2018).  Their proposals seek for 
greater central subsidies for supplies to both the rich and the poor.  Their calling for affordable and 
subsidized water service seem to result in the new setting of the Free Basic Water policy under a 
limited capacity which provides increasing amount of free basic water for those who are most in 
need by eliminating the benefit from those who are not in need.   
The increasing leverages of CSOs with ecological and social beliefs have been translated 
into the creation of important spaces for civic engagement in water management, such as 
‘Catchment Management Forum’ and ‘Regional Water and Sanitation Forum’(Beck et al., 2016).  
These fora are hosted by the Catchment Management Agencies and Regional Water Boards, 
respectively, in cooperation with the Department of Cooperative Governance, Traditional Affairs 
(Beck et al., 2016).  The CSOs have participated in the fora and influenced on water management 
policy by giving input to the government strategies as well as by ensuring proper representation of 
stakeholders in board members.  
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4) Policy-oriented learning for new institutional arrangements 
4-1) Institutional arrangements to support the 1996 Constitution: Free Basic Water 
policy  
The central government implemented the Free Basic Water policy after a wide spread 
cholera outbreak in KwaZulu-Natal in 2000 which was reported to be caused by water cut off 
under public provision for cost-recovery purposes (Counter Punch, 2018). The Free Basic Water 
policy requires that every municipality must provide a minimum of 25 liters of water per person 
per day, or 6 kilo-liters per household of eight per month, which follows the “minimum amount” 
the World Health Organization suggests for basic food and hygiene needs, for free within 200 
meters of the home (South African Government, 2002).  Note that a human right to water 
recognized in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 64/292 established on July, 28, 2010, 
states that a person needs between 50 and 100 liters of water per day to ensure to meet not only 
the basic needs but also health concerns including laundry and bathing.  It also states the water 
source should be 1) safe, meaning that it meets the WHO guidelines for water quality, 2)  
acceptable, meaning that water service should be culturally appropriate and sensitive to gender, 
lifecycle, and privacy, 3) affordable, meaning that water costs should not exceed 3 percent of 
household income, and 4) physically accessible, meaning that the water source has to be within 
1,000 meters of the home and collection time should not exceed 30 minutes.  The 6 kiloliter of 
water per household per month (approximately 1600 gallons) provided by the government in 
Johannesburg is far less than the standard of sufficient water for basic needs and health concerns 
stated in the UN resolution 64/292, indicating that the government takes a limited view of the right 
under limited financial capability.  
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4-2) Institutional arrangements to address limited financial capacity: Increasing 
Block Tariff  
To implement the Free Basic Water policy, the city government started to deal with the 
backlogs of providing basic water and cost recovery strategies.  Initially, the Free Basic Water 
policy was designed to provide basic water needs to all people regardless of their financial status.  
The goals of providing free lifeline water was to improve public health, gender equity, 
environmental protection, economic spin-offs, and the possibility of desegregating residential 
areas by class (Bond, 2005).  However, in the case of Johannesburg, the benefit of the Free Basic 
Water policy is unclear at this point especially because the amount of free water is not enough to 
satisfy basic needs, thus maintaining inequality.  When the Free Basic Water policy was launched, 
the government also introduced the idea of “progressive water pricing” where the free allocation 
of water was the first price block and the consumption after 6kl per month was charged on an 
Increasing Block Tariff basis (McKinley, 2005).  While the higher-end pricing blocks intended to 
subsidize free water available for poorer households, it could also act as a demand control tool that 
provides disincentive to over-consumption (McKinley, 2005).   
The problem of implementing the combination of Free Basic Water policy and an 
Increasing Block Tariff is that after consuming the free basic water, the next consumption block 
could be unaffordable, leading to even higher rates of water disconnections in poor areas.  Indeed, 
many low-income households have more members, often consumed higher volumes of water, and 
received higher water bill with extra charges on luxury consumption (Ourwatercommons, 2019).  
This is why some activist see the Free Basic Water policy as the part of a larger package of water 
commodification, including the introduction of harsh systems of cost recovery and enforcement 
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that still tend to benefit upper-income households and industry at the expense of low-income 
households (Ourwatercommons, 2019).   
In addition to this drawback, an Increasing Block Tariff may introduce a disincentive for 
businesses to supply low-volume users.  Responding to the criticism that the government wasted 
resource on non-poor population, the city government announced that only indigent households 
registered on the Expanded Social Package Program would receive a free basic water allocation of 
increasing amount of water, 10-15 kiloliter per month depending on their poverty level, effectively 
starting in 2017 (Esposto, 2018).  This change brought another debate over whether the application 
process for the program would be burdensome and exclude many poor and vulnerable people 
(BusinessDay, 2018).  Access to water in South Africa has been enhanced by constitutional rights, 
but the implementation of the Constitution has proven challenging, and the amount of free basic 
water also reflects the capability of municipality.  Above all, the sustainability of the municipality 
in finance and management is as important as the right of the individual.  
 
4-3) Institutional arrangements to achieve cost recovery: Prepaid water meter 
In addition to the Free Basic Water policy and the Increasing Block Tariff, prepaid water 
meters have begun to be installed as a mean to address operational efficiency including metering 
and billing, network rehabilitation, water leaks, water usage habits as well as full cost-recovery by 
the Johannesburg Water during the concession with Suez (Legodi, 2008).  Not surprisingly, the 
prepaid water meter installation caused a great level of international and national debate over, and 
resistance against, the meter.  Before the concession, one-third of Johannesburg Water’s purchases 
from Rand Water were pumped into some underprivileged communities like Phiri, Soweto, 70-
percent of which was unbilled or granted at a flat rate of 110 rand (US$15) per month (Africa 
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News, 2006; Smart Energy, 2007).  In 2003, the Johannesburg Water chose Phiri as a pilot of 
project known as Operation Conserve Water, introduced prepaid water meters, and discontinued 
the unlimited water supply (Legodi, 2008).  The prepaid meters have been installed in middle- and 
high-income areas as well to increase accessibility to water for general citizens.  
 Despite resistance against the meter, the city reported that water supplied in this area had 
dropped by 80-percent, five years after the prepaid meter started being installed in 2002 and it 
translated into a R95 million (US$13.4 million) of total saving as of 2007 (Smart Energy, 2007).  
Another measure of prepaid meter reported from Soweto Township in Johannesburg that 
household water consumption dropped from 66 kiloliter to 12 kiloliter per month and water saved 
from prepaid meter project during 2013-2014 period is 25 million kiloliters which is equivalent to 
the value of R880 million dollars (57 million USD) (TimesLive, 2015).   
The satisfaction or dissatisfaction of a prepaid meter perceived by customers has largely 
depended on technical aspects of the meters according to the literature (Heymans et al., 2014).  
Prepaid meter is different from vending machine in many aspects, as the Free Basic Water and the 
Increasing Block Tariff are still applied in prepaid meter setting and the meters can be installed in 
either household or community.  Each household has their own physical card to get water from a 
prepaid meter and their consumption is recorded.  Under this setting, there have been technical 
errors reported: the physical cards could be lost, damaged, or stolen, and it could be difficult to 
buy and replace.  A numerical credit key and keypad could be alternatives to the physical cards, 
but they have not been implemented at scale yet.  Recharging the physical card is another burden, 
as people have to plan their purchases and consumption to ensure they have enough water to get 
through evenings and weekends.  Recharging stations and vendors may not be available during 
weekends and traveling cost and managing the travel time to the stations also matters.  Currently, 
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credit for prepaid electricity meters can be purchased on mobile phone, but not for prepaid water 
meter yet.  The meters are under the risk of vandalism, bypassing, and tampering, all of which 
raise the cost of services.  These technical problems of prepaid meters have been slowly addressed 
during the past decade.  
The outcomes of the prepaid water system are controversial: those who are opposed to 
prepaid meters say they compromise people’s right to water because water is cut off when people 
cannot afford advance payment without scope for appeal or negotiation. In their view, prepaid 
meter meters symbolize the “commodification” of water, and they associate these meters with the 
exclusion from services of those who cannot pay.  They also argue that the large investment 
required to run a prepayment system could be better spent elsewhere to expand and upgrade 
services.  On the other hand, supporters of prepaid meter systems say that the system helps people 
to better budget their water spending and helps the state to better manage its revenue flows to 
invest in extending water services to under-serviced areas.  In their view, water cut-offs are deemed 
constitutionally sound because the non-payment of service bills negatively affects the rights of 
others to water.  In 2014, the World Bank reported that the customers using prepaid meter got 
much more aware of what they would pay and what they get for what they pay (Heymans et al., 
2014).  They conducted focus group and interviews to analyze the outcome of prepaid meters and 
concluded that most customers have gotten aware of the impact of the Increasing Block Tariff 
within a monthly cycle, resulting in lower consumption of water in general.  The report also 
mentioned that the cost effectiveness of prepaid meter systems would depend on the amount of the 
investment specific to the application (e.g., household, community, commercial use, and industry) 
and its opportunity costs for other uses, such as billing system upgrade or education program for 
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demand control (Heymans et al., 2014).  The prepaid meter has still spread with mixed outcomes 
in the dimensions of service affordability, financial sustainability, and socio-economic inclusion.   
 
4-4) Policy learning by a leading political party, African National Congress (ANC)    
It is complicated to categorize a political party, African National Congress (ANC) and to 
analyze their core belief on basic service provision and political discourse with respect to the 
neoliberal paradigm because their belief seems to have shifted throughout the years.  Nelson 
Mandela, the president of the ANC, was elected in 1994 to head South Africa’s first multiethnic 
government.  Before the 1990s, the ANC supported an economic model which held redistribution 
and nationalization as a central theme (Nattrass, 1994).  However, between the 1990 and the 1994 
elections, the ANC’s policies on redistribution slowly softened.  In 1992, the ANC’s policy 
conference effectively removed nationalization as a policy option and radically changed their 
stance on foreign investment from cautious to supportive  (Nattrass, 1994).  Later, the ANC faced 
the first elections for new local government structures scheduled for December 2000 and had to 
fight a campaign to win the vote of the poor.  They promised local job creation, free basic water 
and electricity to poor areas, and gender advancement at the launch of the ANC’s manifesto for 
local government elections (IPS, 2000).  The Free Basic Water policy was finally given legal status 
through the promulgation of tariff regulations in June 2001 and became the national law as 
described previously.  After the election, the ANC has supported the idea of the corporatization 
model of water service.  It is hard to believe that the constitutional right to water would be delivered 
by private business lines and it is questionable whether the private concession was necessary to 
achieve efficiency gains and stop non-payment culture.  South Africa was unique in selecting the 
corporatization model for efficiency gains within a national framework that was committed to the 
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universal provision of essential services in limited quantities.  In this way, the elected members 
from the ANC and officials in the city of Johannesburg attempted to grapple with the delicate 
balancing act of seeking greater efficiency by allowing private concession, while paying attention 
to its social obligations, particularly to historically marginalized parts of the city.  The turnaround 
of the ANC from driving nationalization agenda to corporatization model with providing free basic 
water in the post-Apartheid era challenges the distinction of economic and social beliefs in this 
study as well as the basic assumption of the Advocacy Coalition Framework that policy core belief 
is hardly mutable.   
 
5) Challenges to current water policy under public management  
The implementations of free basic water and prepaid meter policies brought some 
arguments in the judicial system because not only are these two approaches contradictory and 
originated in different policy core beliefs, but also because there are debates on the interpretation 
of the Constitution that requires governments to take  “reasonable” actions to provide “sufficient” 
water.   As a result of these debates, courts at state, national, constitutional levels appeared 
significantly in media report as residents in Phiri claimed that the prepayment meters violated their 
constitutional right of access to water and the city's free basic water supply was quantitatively 
insufficient.  The case commenced in the High Court, was appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, and ended up in the Constitutional Court in 2009 (Mail & Guardian, 2009).  The High 
Court declared that the prepayment meter was unconstitutional and unlawful and ordered the City 
to provide with a free water of 50 liter per day.  However, the Constitutional Court dismissed the 
applicants' appeal and said the city's free water policies and laws were reasonable and that the 
installation of the prepayment water meters was neither unfair nor discriminatory (Mail & 
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Guardian, 2009).  It also said that the Constitution has guaranteed only the "progressive 
realization" of a right to water due to limited finance.   
The outcomes of the corporatization model in water management are also debatable. 
Through the short-term contract with Suez, the city government attempted to achieve institutional 
rearrangement of water governance, the outcome of which was half successful.  Laila Smith, in 
her paper, explained that the Johannesburg’s concession with the Suez under corporatization model 
involved a three-phased approach: 1) ring-fencing, meaning that all of the costs incurred in 
providing a service are identified and centralized for the sake of greater transparency; 2) insulation 
from political interference, which involves transforming the sector into a business unit and 
nourishing a corporate culture for running a specific sector autonomously; and 3) institutional 
removal from the state in order to separate the politics of policy development from operations 
(Smith, 2006).  In the literature, these processes of corporatization are often considered as the first 
step in the privatization process because it involved the commercializing process of a state-owned 
entity to make it “economically viable” (McDonald et al., 2005b).  However, the corporatization 
process of Johannesburg water entity was somewhat different in that it was not the pre-step of 
privatization.  Rather it was chosen to change a nonpayment culture that existed during the 
Apartheid era as well as to avoid political debates and resistance that would often accompany the 
privatization of water entity.  By applying cost-recovery approaches such as Increasing Block 
Tariff and a prepaid meter system, the corporatized entity was perceived to achieve increased 
efficiency by some local authorities (Smith, 2006).  Smith also explains that the impact of such 
institutional rearrangement, however, was limited because of three reasons: 1) the autonomy of the 
Johannesburg Water was limited in that the city government was still in charge of revenue function 
such as billing, credit control, and meter reading for the majority of the city’s residents in the 
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beginning of the concession.  Later, the city has transferred the revenue functions over to the 
Johannesburg Water; 2) the limited autonomy, authority, and capacity of the Contract Management 
Unit as a quasi-regulator remaining within the city opposed to an independent entity, was 
constrained in passing judgement on the behavior of the Johannesburg Water, making it hard to 
develop enforcement mechanisms for the contractor under numerous political and bureaucratic 
sensitivities such as an electoral cycle; 3) the limited impact was attributed to the distance between 
the city, who focused on equity objectives driven by political purposes, and the board of directors, 
who prioritized efficiency objectives with the intent of making Johannesburg Water more 
commercially viable.  The concession of Johannesburg Water reveals that the tensions embedded 
between the city and the board of directors was inevitable even in the corporatization model where 
the city government appointed the board members (Smith, 2006).  
 
6) Conclusions 
First, South Africa has adopted a human right to water in their constitutions and provided 
minimum free water as a mean of guaranteeing the right.  At the same time, the ANC shifted their 
economic policy from nationalization to neoliberal economic policy, allowing the privatization of 
a water entity which employed some neoliberal approaches to water management including 
prepaid meters and Increasing Block Tariff under the objective of cost recovery.  The 
Johannesburg case is unique in selecting the private management model within a national 
framework that is committed to the universal provision of essential services in limited quantities 
of 25 liter per person per day for basic food and hygiene needs.  These approaches do not appear 
to comport with the common concept of a human right to water which demands a supply of water 
between 50 to 100 liters per person per day for basic needs and health concerns regardless of ability 
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to pay.  The prepaid installation and Increasing Block Tariff approaches show that it is possible to 
achieve at least partial cost recovery and conserve water consumption.  On whole, the city of 
Johannesburg has attempted to achieve a progressive realization of its right to water under limited 
financial capability.  The case of Johannesburg indicates that achieving a human right to water is 
in tension with financially viable water services, but the two are not mutually exclusive.  It also 
implies that economic and social beliefs can be adopted compatibly in one water management 
policy subsystem.  
Second, the creation of a corporatized unit, Johannesburg Water, was seen as a 
commodified and de-politicized processes of water entity and was an attempt to improve efficiency 
of management and change the nonpayment culture that resulted from Apartheid era.  The 
outcomes of the corporatization model were limited under limited autonomy of Johannesburg 
Water, limited authority and capacity of the regulatory entity, the Contract Management Unit, and 
the inevitable tension between the city and the board of directors under two different objectives, 
social equity and financial efficiency, respectively.  The contract was granted only for five years 
and was not renewed.  The remaining questions are whether a corporatized entity under the private 
business law can uphold the city’s objective of social equity and whether the quest for increased 
efficiency can translate into a greater ability of the corporatized entity to deal with equity concerns.  
The ‘not for profit’ characteristic of the corporation entity may reduce political opposition to 
private concession under the corporation model.  Ultimately, the answers to these questions would 
depend on the nature of the relationship between the city and the board of directors through a 
binding agreement and the regulatory mechanisms set up to provide oversight of this agreement.   
Third, there are several CSOs who have opposed the concept of prepaid meter and 
privatization, creating a new organizational voice for those socially, economically and politically 
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marginalized under a neo-liberal regime.  Their efforts were reflected in government policy in that 
the National Water Act has required all catchment management agencies to ensure 
representativeness of all stakeholders on the criteria for appointment of members of the governing 
boards of the catchment management agencies.  In addition to CSOs with social beliefs, plenty of 
CSOs with ecological belief have been working for valuing water and integrated catchment 
management.  Both groups of CSOs have successfully created spaces for civic engagement in 
water governance in cooperation with national and municipal governments. This indicates that 
policy learning across coalitions holding social and ecological beliefs makes synergetic impact on 
policy making and contributes to environmentally sustainable and socially equitable water 
governance.      
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3.4 METRO MANILA, PHILIPPINES: A FAST-GROWING CITY WITH 
OVERWHELMING POPULATION 
Metro Manila is one of the most populated cities in the world with a population of 12 
million people.  President Ramos’s office eagerly privatized the Manila’s water entity, MWSS, 
based on the Water Crisis law and the Build-Operate-Transfer law which gave the government an 
authority to reform the MWSS.  The processes of biding and contracting during the MWSS’ 
privatization involved international consultants and a research unit for transparency and 
profitability.  Yet, the implementation of water privatization still suffered from the issues of 
incomplete information, unjustified debt distribution, and unforeseen events such as 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis and the bankruptcy of Maynilad.  The researcher of this study requested an 
interview to the Manila Water several times by phone and emails, but they circulated my request 
and did not respond.   
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Source: Google Map 
 
The Philippines has one of the fastest growing populations in Southeast Asia:  From fifty 
million in 1980, the Philippines now has around hundred million people, especially with twelve 
millions living in the Metro Manila area (Philippines Statistics Authority, 2016).  The Metro 
Manila refers to National Capital Region (NCR), the metropolitan area composed of 16 cities and 
is the most densely populated area in the world.  The country is composed of more than 7000 
islands and their water resource has been divided into 12 water resource regions which follow 
Figure 12. Manila in Philippines 
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hydrological boundaries defined by physiographic features and homogeneity of climate in the 
different parts of the country (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2011).   
 
1) Policy stakeholders and their policy core belief on water 
Table 18 shows the list of organizations and their core belief on water identified by the 
content analysis of this study. 
 
Table 18. Classification of organizations and their core beliefs on water in Manila case 
View on 
water 
Grassroots CSOs International CSOs Public actors Private actors 
Economic 
good 
Action for 
Economic Research 
(AER) 
 
World Bank 
WHO 
Asian Development 
Bank 
UN, UNDP 
IMF 
AquaFed 
International 
Finance 
Corporation 
 
 
U.S. 
Committee on 
Privatization 
Development 
Bank of the 
Philippines 
 
Maynilad Water 
Manila Water 
Suez 
Benpres Holdings 
Betchel 
Ayala corporation 
United Utilities 
AsiaMoney 
United Utilities 
Mitsubishi 
DM Consunji 
Holdings 
Metro Pacific 
Investments 
Corporation 
National Economic 
Research Associates 
(NERA) 
Social 
good 
Philippine Water 
Vigilance Network 
(Bantay Tubig) 
Water for the 
People Network 
Progressive 
Alliance of Metro 
Manila Water 
Consumers 
(PATTAK) 
Institute for Popular 
Democracy 
IBON Foundation 
Freedom from Debt 
Coalition (FDC) 
 
 Asian Labor 
Network 
Peace Equity 
Foundation 
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Philippine Center 
for Water and 
Sanitation  
Streams of 
Knowledge 
Akbayan Citizens’ 
Action Party 
Social Reform 
Taguig Agenda 
(SRTA) 
 
Ecological 
good 
Fisherfolk alliance 
Pamalakaya 
Waves for water 
Philippine 
Partnership for the 
Development of 
Human Resources 
in Rural Areas 
(PhilDHRRA) 
    
Sector   Philippine 
government 
Department of 
Finance 
Department of 
Public Works 
and Highways 
MWSS 
National Water 
Resources Board 
(NWRB) 
Philippine 
Economic Zone 
Authority 
UNDP 
Inpart Waterworks 
and Development 
Company 
Philippine National 
Bank 
Banco de Oro 
Keppel 
Duetsche 
First Metro 
Investment Corp 
Rizal Commercial 
Banking Corp 
BNP Paribas 
Citicorp 
International 
Source: own analysis 
 
Table 18 indicates that there are numerous organizations who participated in Manila’s 
water policy subsystem, including different levels of governments, civil society organizations at 
local and international levels, and private companies.  Especially, there are many finance 
organizations which support the finances of the private concessionaires and appear in media 
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reports.  The concessionaires have been required to invest massive capitals for expanding and 
maintaining the water service.  The bankruptcy of Maynilad is a result of their failure to gain loans 
from finance organizations.     
 
2) Water policy subsystem 
Among many stakeholders, the content analysis of Manila case reveals that in addition to 
the government of Philippines, two private actors, Manila Water and Maynilad, and an 
international actor, International Finance Corporation (IFC) earn high betweenness centrality as 
shown in Table 19.  It indicates that the private and international actors actively participate in 
decision-making in the Manila case.  
 
Table 19. Betweenness centrality of stakeholders in Manila water policy subsystem 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own analysis, using R software 
 
Figure 13 features key stakeholders and their interactions with other stakeholders for 
Manila case. 
Key Stakeholder Betweenness centrality 
GOP 59.08333 
MANILA_WATER 31.00000 
MAYNILAD 31.00000 
MWSS 25.58333 
IFC 14.08333 
REGULATORY_OFFICE 2.25000 
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Figure 13. Key stakeholders and their interactions with other stakeholders within Manila 
water policy subsystem 
Policy core beliefs: Brown represents the social belief; Blue represents administration belief; 
Yellow represents economic belief following Table 2 / local nonprofit in circle; international 
nonprofit in triangle; private in diamond; public in square / Ties among stakeholders mean 
relationship as explained in Page 16 
Source: own analysis, using R software 
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Figure 13 shows that, similar to the Cochabamba case, the interactions among stakeholders 
in the Manila case are polarized between economic and social beliefs.  During the bankruptcy of 
Maynilad, a number of civil society organizations including Bantay Tubig, and Freedom from 
Debt Coalition in Philippines called for re-municipalization of the MWSS, but the government re-
privatized the MWSS and granted the concession to a local consortium.  The researcher of this 
study could not find much interaction among the civil society organizations, implying that the 
political leverages of civil society organizations and their social mobilization in water governance 
are not yet matured.  Figure 14 shows the variables captured under the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework for Manila case. 
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Figure 14. Variables captured under the Advocacy Coalition Framework for Manila case 
Arrows indicate causal relationship between variables 
Source: own analysis, using AnyLogic software 
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3) Before privatization of MWSS 
Philippine laws have had various nomenclature designations at different periods in the 
history of the Philippines.  During 1972-1986, Philippine laws of the republic government under 
Martial Laws were called President Decree.  There were three Presidential Decrees that had 
governed water resource in Philippines before 1987 constitution: the Presidential Decree 1067 
(Water Code), the Presidential Decree 984 (Pollution Control Law), and the Presidential Decree 
825 (Environmental Code).  They were established in 1976-1977 and provided guidelines on 
natural resource management for decades.  Especially, the Water Code has reiterated that the water 
belongs to the state and should not be the subject of acquisitive prescription.  The code has 
permitted water concession and has reiterated that the measure and limit of appropriation of water 
should be its beneficial use.  Based on the Presidential Decrees, the National Water Resources 
Board (NWRB) was instituted and has consolidated the laws governing water resource regarding 
its ownership, appropriation, utilization, exploitation, development, conservation, and protection 
since 1974.   
Prior to the privatization of MWSS, the Philippine government passed two laws to grant 
itself the authority to privatize MWSS: the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law (Republic Act No. 
7718) enacted in 1990 and the National Water Crisis Law (Republic Act No. 8041) enacted in 
1995.  The BOT law has authorized the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of 
infrastructure projects by private sectors, and was amended in 2012.  Table 20 is the brief statement 
of the BOT law (Republic of the Philippines, 2012).  
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Table 20. Brief statement of the Build-Operate-Transfer law 
Section 1. It is the declared policy of the State to recognize the indispensable role of the private 
sector as the main engine for national growth and development and to provide the most 
appropriate favorable incentives to mobilize private resources for the purpose.    
Section 3. Private Initiative in Infrastructure: All government infrastructure agencies, including 
government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) and local government units (LGUs), 
are hereby authorized to enter into contract with any duly prequalified private contractor for 
the financing, construction, operation, and maintenance of any financially viable 
infrastructure facilities through the build-operate-transfer or build-and-transfer scheme, 
subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth. 
Source: Republic of Philippines, 2012 
 
In addition to the BOT law, the government enacted the Water Crisis Act which authorized 
the President to re-organize MWSS, including the privatization of any or all of its segments, 
operations, or facilities under the object of making them more effective and innovative to address 
the looming water crisis.  Table 21 is the brief statement of the Water Crisis Law adopted from 
Chanrobles website (Chanrobles, 1995).  
 
Table 21. Brief statement of the Water Crisis Law 
Section 4. Purposes and Objectives 
The Commission shall have the following purposes and objectives: a. to undertake nationwide 
consultations on the water crisis and in depth and detailed study and review of the entire water 
supply and distribution structure; 
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Section 6. Negotiated Contracts 
For projects to be implemented under BOT and/or related schemes, the President may, for one 
year after effectivity of this Act, enter into negotiated contracts for the financing, construction, 
repair, rehabilitation, improvement, and operation of water facilities and projects related to 
increasing water supply, its treatment and its distribution to industrial and household consumers: 
Provided, that there is no government financing or financing guarantee for the contracts except 
for the acquisition of right-of-way. 
Source: Chanrobles, 1995 
 
These two laws, the BOT law and the Water Crisis law, were the main basis for the 
privatization of MWSS to occur and be supported.  
 
Distribution of risk between the government and concessionaires 
Before the privatization, the government attempted to distribute the potential risks of the 
MWSS privatization by three folds: increasing water rate, decreasing the MWSS labor force, and 
setting up performance bonds.  
First, the government decreased the MWSS labor force by 30-percent, five months before 
the MWSS privatization.  Dumol noted that the reduction in the labor force was a key feature of 
the transaction and one of the most difficult issues concessionaires would have to deal with to 
achieve efficiency of MWSS (Dumol, 2000).  Based on the Water Crisis Act, in which the reforms 
were exempted in the provisions of Attribution Law and Salary Standardization Law, the MWSS 
offered their employees compensation package, tax-free severance pays, and termination-and re-
hiring process, smoothly reducing labor force before privatization.  Dumol’s evaluation of this 
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process is that “it gave the future concessionaires a much freer hand in running the business. The 
fact that all employees were going to start from scratch with the concessionaires also gave great 
comfort to the bidders…this significantly contributed toward soothing the bidders and reducing 
their perception of the risk of the transaction. Ultimately, all of these helped reduce the bid prices” 
(Dumol, 2000). 
In addition to labor force reduction, the water tariffs were increased by about 38-percent 
five months before privatization took place.  Mark Dumol stated that “tariff increase was actually 
long overdue and would have been implemented regardless of privatization.  Nevertheless, it gave 
us a substantially greater chance that the bids would be lower.  More important, it conceptually set 
the tariffs at the correct level prior to privatization. This gave us a fair chance to prove that the bid 
tariffs would be lower than the current tariff because of the much higher efficiency of the private 
sector. This theory would certainly not work if the current tariffs were way below what they should 
have been or if utility operations were subsidized” (Dumol, 2000).  He also explained that the tariff 
increase was actually ready for implementation by the MWSS Board earlier but President Ramos 
tried to avoid political risk of implementing a controversial tax law and water tariff increase at the 
same time (Dumol, 2000).  So, the tariff increase was delayed but took place before privatization 
along with a campaign of leak repairs to justify the increase.  These reforms on tariff and labor 
force were proof that the government had the political will to do painful reforms on MWSS in the 
first place and comforted bidders with respect to the risks of involvement. 
 To reduce the risk on the government side, the government also required each 
concessionaire to put up $200 million for a performance bond which would work as a kind of 
insurance money that the government could forfeit in case of unfulfilled contract obligation of 
concessionaires.  These three institutional arrangements of tariff increase, labor force reduction, 
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and establishing performance bonds before MWSS privatization indicate that the Philippines 
government attempted transparency in their effort on MWSS reforms and built a safeguard for 
themselves.   
 
3) Policy change: Privatization of the MWSS led by President Ramos 
The privatization of MWSS was initiated by the central government, especially by 
President Fidel Ramos (1992-1998).  Facing the high demands of a growing population, President 
Ramos released the “Philippines 2000” plan, a blueprint for economic growth, in 1992.  Then the 
Ramos administration introduced competitive bidding in privatizing public utilities including 
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), water service entity in Metro Manila 
and power plants.  At that time, the MWSS was characterized by high inefficiency and lack of 
management capability; it had a US$880 million debt and was unable to provide water to one-third 
of all households (Asian Development Bank, 2012).  The households actually connected to the 
service had an intermittent supply of 17 hours a day on average and non-revenue water was around 
60-percent of water produced (Asian Development Bank, 2012).   
President Ramos was authorized and empowered by Water Crisis Law and set the water 
crisis and the reform of MWSS as the priority.  The Water Crisis Law was powerful in a sense that 
reform conducted by the president and the Board of Trustee was exempted from the provisions of 
the Attribution Law and the Salary Standardization Law.  The law authorized the president to 
obtain all powers to abolish or create offices, transfer functions, equipment, properties, records, 
and personnel without compensating to existing salaries or benefit of MWSS employees, which 
would result in a drastic cost-cutting and other related measures under the purpose of MWSS 
reform.  Mark Dumol, a former chief of staff of the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, 
121 
noted in his book that “president Ramos tremendously contributed [to] the advancement of the 
MWSS and was particularly indispensable in terms of making people aware of the water crisis and 
developing a consensus on the need to address it” (Dumol, 2000).   
The MWSS was handed over to two private companies in 1997 under 25-year concessions: 
1) the east zone of Manila was granted to Manila Water, a joint venture consisting of Ayala (a 
Philippines conglomerate), United Utilities (a U.K. corporation), Bechtel (a  U.S. corporation), 
and Mitsubishi (a Japanese corporation); 2) the west zone was granted to Maynilad Water Services 
Inc, initially a joint venture between Benpress Holdings Corporation and Suez.  In 2006, due to 
financial struggle, Mayniland sold 84-percent of the company to the Philippine Government and 
the government sold their share to DM Consunji Holdings, Inc (DMCI), a consortium of the 
Filipino construction company, as well as Metro Pacific Investments Corporation (MPIC), a 
Filipino real estate company in the same year.   
 
Institutional arrangement to support MWSS privatization- 1) the third-party 
consultants for bidding and agreements 
The decision for MWSS privatization was led by a top-down approach, but the process of 
privatization was carefully designed and proceeded by multiple key actors.  First, the government 
hired the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and SOGREAH as external consultants for 
privatization process.  The IFC, as an arm within the World Bank, had been playing a crucial role 
in private sector development and attempted to balance between interests of private companies and 
the Philippines government.  Presidential approval has been given for the appointment of the IFC 
as a lead advisor and the IFC prepared operating and investment agreements and supervised the 
competitive bidding process.  Throughout the assignment, the IFC also coordinated and integrated 
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the work of all consultants, including SOGREAH.  The SOGREAH is a French consultant which 
provided technical consulting to the Philippines government, particularly for the bidding process.  
When the government decided to bid out the MWSS, they looked for a grant to support the bidding 
process. They failed to get grants from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the 
United Kingdom's DTI, but finally got one from the French government (Dumol, 2000).  With the 
grant, the government hired a French consulting firm, SOGREAH, recommended by the French 
government.  The Philippine government accepted the recommendation particularly because the 
company was not connected with any French water companies who might join the bidding (Dumol, 
2000). The government also had MWSS to get a loan from a national government to facilitate the 
bidding process and planned to pay back with $10 million "commencement fee" that they would 
charge on winning bidders.  The SOGREAH advised the government for transparent and careful 
bidding process in that all bidders should comprise a Filipino and an international company and 
the Filipino local companies had to be prequalified based on financial capacity, perceived 
knowledge, and experience with large projects (Circle of Blue, 2012).   
 
Institutional arrangement to support the MWSS privatization - 2) split of the service 
zone for creating competition and comparison  
Following the IFC and SOGREAH’s advice, the government split the MWSS service area 
into two zones despite complications arising from the split.  There were pros and cons of doing 
this.  The pros involve the ideas that the government could compare costs of concessionaires and 
the competition between two concessionaires would give the government more leverage during 
negotiation and regulation development and practice.  In addition, in case one concessionaire has 
financial and technical troubles, the other concessionaire could take over.  Thus, SOGREAH split 
123 
the MWSS into the East and West zones based on serving population, profitable core, and an 
expansion area (Dumol, 2000).  The cons involve the complications arising from having two 
concessions extend beyond the difference in the tariffs and interconnection agreement.  
Furthermore, the split of existing debt was an issue as well.  Eventually, SOGREAH divided the 
service region into two and decided that the West region took 80-percent of debt and the East took 
20-percent based on the conditions of existing infrastructure and the amount of investment needed 
for future development (Circle of Blue, 2012).  Another drawback was the complication of having 
two headquarters, as well as the distribution of employees and the organization of the division.  
Finally, Dumol also noted that splitting the MWSS into two companies was financially inefficient 
given previously unified water and sewerage distribution system.  Dumol, however, noted that it 
was useful in the evaluation of common petitions for price increases (Dumol, 2000).   
 
Institutional arrangement to support the MWSS privatization -3) Tariff policy with 
National Economic Research Associates (NERA) 
Before contracting was concluded, the government detailed tariff increases and duties.  
Another consultant for MWSS privatization came from National Economic Research Associates 
(NERA) and the consultant proposed to utilize a tariff escalation procedure, called "rate rebasing," 
which in theory helped concessionaires guarantee a certain rate of return and thus prevent 
bankruptcy.  At the same time, the tariff increase procedure also provided the government with 
authority to determine the value of the return by evaluating appropriate discount rate given similar 
infrastructure projects in similar economies or countries.  In sum, the tariff increase was officially 
set up in three cases:  
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1) Inflation: tariffs are adjusted annually on the basis of inflation in terms of consumer price 
index and appropriate discount rate set by the regulator  
2) Extraordinary Price Adjustment (EPA): tariffs are adjusted to capture the financial effects 
of certain unforeseen events to the concessionaire. Hence, should there be a drastic 
devaluation of the Peso extraordinary price adjustments may be made.  The EPA 
essentially provides protection to the company against a force majeure, or unanticipated 
costs arising from, for instance, new health or environmental standards that may be 
legislated in the future.  The regulatory office would determine whether an EPA has 
indeed happened that necessitates price increases.  
3) Rate-rebasing: tariffs are adjusted every five years to guarantee a certain rate of return to 
the private concession holder. The company's performance vis-à-vis  regulatory targets is 
also considered in determining the tariff.  The concession agreement provides for a 
review of tariffs so that they can be adjusted in case they exceed the definition of 'fair 
returns' stipulated in the contract. This gradual readjustment made every five-year cycle 
was designed to benefit both consumers and concessionaires subsequently from the 
concessionaire’s efficiency gains. 
As seen above, the detailed tariff increase procedure and agreement have been established 
to avoid as much ambiguity as possible.  In addition, the contract also detailed the duties of 
concessionaires. The companies would have to lower the non-revenue water of two-third of water 
produced at time to 32-percent and 100-percent coverage of water access for the first 10 years, and 
capital inflow of $7.5 billion for 25 years.  The contract also required that the water should meet 
the quality standard set by government.  In sum, the Philippine government, by involving external 
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adviser groups like the IFC, the SOGREAH, and the NERA, attempted to achieve the transparency 
of bidding and contract processes and to detail the tariff increase procedure at a reasonable level.  
 
4) Coalition of stakeholders 
4-1) A minimal opposition to the MWSS privatization 
Opposition to privatization of MWSS was not observed in the content analysis of this study, 
but the dissertation of Chng reported that there were a few protests done by Ruth’s water people’s 
organization in Taguig City, protest groups in Caloocan City, and the NGOs in Metro Manila 
(Chng, 2013).  These protests did not appear in major media and reports collected for the content 
analysis of this study, implying that the MWSS privatization was perceived as a viable alternative 
by general citizens.   
The content analysis revealed that the experience of privatization in the power sector and 
lower tariff setting under private management model than public management model could be the 
reasons for minimal opposition to the MWSS privatization.  First, previous experience of 
privatization in the power sector made privatization of MWSS to be perceived as a feasible option 
to address inefficiency of state-owned utility by both government officials and general citizens 
(South China Morning Post, 1993; The Associated Press, 1992; The Association Press, 1992).  The 
state suffered from multiple power outages during 1992-1993 and the congress enacted the Power 
Crisis Law in 1993 which allowed the entry of independent power producers in the generation 
activity in the country.  By making the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) arrangement and privatizing 
the power sector, the government increased electric power capacity and solved the outage issue by 
the end of 1994 (Patalinghug, 2003).  Such a dramatic experience with power sector privatization 
contributed to the formation of a pro-privatization environment in Manila in mid-1990.  This is an 
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example that experiences in other policy subsystems like the power sector influence the decision-
making in water policy subsystem.  
Another factor contributing to the minimal opposition to MWSS privatization is the lower 
tariff policy.  During the bidding process, the government ensured that the bids would be equal to 
or lower than the previous tariff, which prevented political opposition and led smooth transition of 
publicly owned utility to private companies.  The contract resulted in the private companies 
offering to do the work at considerably lower price than what customers were paying that time.  In 
the East Zone, Manila Water offered to charge only one quarter (26.39-percent) of the existing 
rates, while in the West Zone, Maynilad offered to charge only half (56.59-percent) of the existing 
rate (Transnational Institute, 2005).  Tariffs remained close to these low levels for five years until 
the first rate-rebasing took place in 2002, followed by further significant tariff increases.   
External event: 1997 Asian Financial Crisis  
Unfortunately, the agreements on tariff adjustment were incomplete and not exactly 
followed due in part to the devaluation of the Peso, Filipino currency, during the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis.  There was a substantial depreciation of the Peso during the crisis which affected 
the companies' capacity to services the loans they inherited from MWSS (Transnational Institute, 
2005).  The concessionaires requested an extraordinary price adjustment within two years instead 
of five years, as had been stated in the original agreements.  Then the government added the 
Foreign Currency Differential Adjustment, which applied accelerated extraordinary price 
adjustment and foreign currency adjustment as well as reduced the service obligations, to help 
concessionaires recoup foreign exchange losses over the past two years.  After the adjustment, the 
Manila Water increased their water price by 64-percent and the Maynilad increased their water 
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price by 7-percent (Freedom from Debt Coalition, 2009).  The greater rate increase for the Manila 
Water could be explained mainly because their bidding price was very low: only one quarter 
(26.39-percent) of the 1996 water rate, as described previously.  Such premature rate-rebasing is 
seen to undermine the validity of the original bidding, and the Manila Water appears to have taken 
advantage of it by submitting a low bid and then increasing the rate substantially within two years 
(Corporate Accountability International, 2017).   
Internal events: E. Coli outbreak, pollution on Manila Bay, and bankruptcy of the 
Maynilad  
There were a few crucial incidents that called for re-municipalization of MWSS after 
privatization.  The first incident was the E. Coli outbreak that happened in October 2003.  A case 
in which 600 residents were sickened and six died with water provided by Maynilad (Freedom 
from Debt Coalition, 2005).  Responding to this incident, Republic Act No. 9275 (2004), known 
as the Clean Water Act, was enacted to enforce water quality standards and regulations.  Another 
incident was the pollution on Manila Bay.  In 2008, the Supreme Court of the Philippines ordered 
several government agencies, including MWSS, to clean up the Manila Bay.  The Court stated that 
the bay was polluted because of “the abject official indifference of people and institutions" (GMA 
News, 2008).  Consequently, the concessionaires established the Manila Wastewater Management 
Project for sewerage and wastewater treatment, and got a loan of US$275 from the World Bank in 
2012 (World Bank, 2012). 
Finally, the calling for re-municipalization increased during the issue of the bankruptcy of 
the Maynilad group.  Despite the government’s effort to navigate MWSS concession for qualified 
concessionaires and an unambiguous agreement, it could not prevent the Maynilad from claiming 
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bankruptcy in 2003.  The process of filing Maynilad’s bankruptcy raised a lot of conflicts and 
debates.  In March 2001, the Maynilad faced financial difficulties and left $100 million of 
concession fee unpaid to the MWSS and the MWSS had to acquire a loan from Deutsche Bank to 
cover maturing loans to the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and the Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation in May 2002.  However, Maynilad still sought to terminate the contract 
in December 2002 and filed a case with the Arbitration Court, claiming that MWSS failed to 
deliver its part of the concession agreement.  MWSS filed its countersuit and the International 
Arbitration Panel decided in favor of the continuation of the concession agreement in November 
2003.  Maynilad, however, filed a petition for corporate rehabilitation which prevented the MWSS 
from pulling $120 million of the performance bond that Maynilad had deposited at Citicorp 
International.  When the Supreme court decision was not made yet, Maynilad and MWSS officials 
declared a joint statement for settlement.  The settlement stated that MWSS would draw only $50M 
of the $120M performance bond and $70 million of the performance bond would be foregone.  The 
settlement also stated that no further legal action should proceed regardless of the Supreme Court 
decision.  Then, a huge debate arose whether the MWSS was compensated enough and whether 
the government gave up the remaining performance bond too quickly before the court ruling 
(Freedom from Debt Coalition, 2005; WaterAid, 2003).  Several months after the settlement, the 
Supreme Court decision gave the government strong leverage to deal decisively with Maynilad 
with respect to their concession fees. The government explained that they urged to make a quick 
settlement before the Supreme Court decision because of the threat of service interruptions in the 
West zone.    
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4-2) Increasing grassroot CSOs against the settlement between the government and 
the Maynilad 
In the middle of the conflict between the Maynilad and the government, many civil society 
organizations opposed the settlement and accused the government of freeing the Lapez group, 
which was mainly responsible for the Maynilad management from contingent liabilities and debt, 
at the cost of taxpayers. Bantay Tubig, for example, strongly argued that the MWSS should draw 
on the entire performance bond and take over the water utility to public hands rather than looking 
for another private concessionaire (Bantay Tubig, 2004).  They also called on the Lopez group to 
pay its liabilities to the government.  The reports from the Public Citizen and the Freedom from 
Debt Coalition highlighted that contract renegotiations, including tariff increases, burdened 
customers and were a clear indication of privatization’s failure, and thus led them to advocating 
for a public water provision (Freedom from Debt Coalition, 2005; Public Citizen, 2003b).  Such 
oppositions to contract re-negotiation and bailout, however, could not stop the government from 
continuing to seek private concessionaires for MWSS.  Maynilad filed for bankruptcy in 2003 and 
the services were handed back to MWSS in 2005.  MWSS ran the system for two years and then 
bid the concession out to local consortiums of DM Consunji Holding (DMCH) and Metro Pacific 
Investments Corporation (MPIC) in 2007.  The continuing privatization of the MWSS indicated 
that the civil society organizations in Philippines have not obtained strong enough leverage to 
change water policy, though the grassroot social mobilization toward re-municipalization is getting 
more courageous and stronger.  Several ‘Community Water Service Cooperative’ at local 
communities were formed under the influence of civil society organizations (Chng, 2013). 
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Manila Water vs Maynilad  
The Manila case raised a crucial question why Maynilad failed but Manila Water 
succeeded. There are several analyses to explain the outcomes.  The first reason for the Maynilad 
failure lies on the difference in the distribution of the historical debt of the MWSS.  The Maynilad 
oversaw 80-percent of the debt of MWSS while the Manila Water only oversaw 20-percent.  The 
intention of the government was to share the debt burden more equitably between the two 
concessionaires based on technical and financial reports (Dumol, 2000).  Yet, Maynilad’s financial 
burden was devastating especially when the devaluation of the Peso hit the country.  Secondly, the 
west zone under the Maynilad’s management, compared to the east zone under Manila Water’s 
management, contains a much greater area that requires capital investment to increase connection 
to low-income populations (WaterAid, 2003).  Thirdly, the failure of the Maynilad arose from 
inaccurate information given by the government during the bidding process.  The information on 
the length of the distribution network to be maintained in the bid document was 2534 kilometers, 
but the actual length was 3880 kilometers, making it difficult for the Maynilad to manage their 
financial situation (WaterAid, 2003).  In addition, the two companies utilized different financing 
models.   While Manila Water resorted to corporate finance by putting the assets of its owners 
Bechtel and Ayala Corporation at stake, Maynilad used project-based finance to request a term 
loan (Circle of Blue, 2012).   This meant that in terms of obtaining a loan, the credit and reputation 
of Manila Water matters whereas the receivables of the project itself needs to be secured for 
Maynilad, which was more influenced by rate rebasing and regulations.  This difference led 
Maynilad to fail to finance capital expenditures in the first five years of operations (Circle of Blue, 
2012).  Lastly, different approaches between Maynilad and to non-revenue water caused different 
outcomes.  Non-revenue water was 61-percent before privatization.  In 2003, Manila Water 
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launched “Water for the Community” where the company provided community pipelines at a fixed 
installation cost and the low-income communities paid below what MWSS charged its customer 
base.  The program allowed Manila Water to gain popular support and meet the government's 
directives under the concession agreement  and the company successfully reduced its non-revenue 
water usage to 27.5-percent in 2004 (Kapoor, 2015).  In 2005, Manila Water’s customer base 
doubled and in 2006, all customers of Manila Water had twenty-four hour water access.  On the 
other hand, Maynilad monitored water distribution system and penalized water theft. This 
threatening and enforcement strategy did not work effectively and non-revenue water in west zone 
deteriorated to 68-percent in 2003 (Public Citizen, 2003b).  The different experience of non-
revenue water between Manila Water and Maynilad illustrates that community involvement and 
cooperation are the keys for success in water privatization.  
Manila Water, based on the improvement of revenue, gained the trust of investors and 
obtained a US$30 million loan from the International Finance Corporation (IFC) in 2003, followed 
by two more loans of the same amount (IFC, 2008).  This helped the Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
of the company's shares on the Manila stock exchange in 2004, the first IPO since the 1997 Asian 
Financial crisis.  The IPO raised nearly US$100 million and Manila Water issued several local 
currency bonds in 2008 (Asia Law, 2005).  The Maynilad's new owners began to invest more 
heavily and made progress on service improvement.  During 2007 and 2011, the population served 
from the Maynilad increased from 6.4 to 7.8 million and non-revenue water decreased from 67-
percent to 47-percent (Maynilad, 2012).  In 2009, Manila Water's concession was extended until 
2037 instead of 2022 as stated in the initial agreement (ABS CBN News, 2009).  In 2010, 
Maynilad's concession was also extended until 2037 (Manila Bulletin, 2010).  
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Institutional arrangement for participatory management - The Philippine Water 
Supply Sector Roadmap 
In 2016, the MWSS launched “The Philippine Water Supply Sector Roadmap,” which was 
initiated by a joint effort of the National Economic Development Agency and National Water 
Resources Board, together with various sector stakeholders, such as national government agencies, 
water service providers and non-governmental organizations.  They state that “it seeks to address 
the gaps and challenges previously identified by various sector studies conducted by international 
development agencies and research institutions, statistical data from the National Statistics Office 
as well as monitoring data from various government agencies such as the Department of Interior 
and Local Government, Local Water Utilities Administration and the National Water Resources 
Board.”  It is too early to evaluate the impact of the program, but at least, it has created for 
participatory governance of various stakeholders including civil society organizations.  Several 
water cooperatives have been formed for community-based water management under the 
increasing left-wing political parties such as Akbayan Citizens’ Action Party and Social Reform 
Taguig Agenda (SRTA).  
 
5) Challenges to current water policy under private management 
5-1) Weak regulating entity under pressure of transnational companies 
The Regulatory Office has played a very important role especially in interpreting the 
contract agreement, managing the subjective nature of tariff adjustments, and determining the 
appropriate discount rate in MWSS privatization.  They have also been regulated concessionaires 
with respect to all their obligations under the concession agreement.  Ideally, the Regulatory Office 
needed to be financially and politically independent of both the concessionaires and the MWSS 
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because it needed to judge on matters of dispute in a disinterested manner.  However, in the case 
of Manila, the Regulatory Office was set up within the MWSS.  Since the office was created in the 
middle of the privatization process, it did not provide for transparency or public involvement.  
More importantly, the Regulatory Office has been funded by concessionaires.  Freedom from Debt 
Coalition questioned how such a regulator office, funded by private companies and existing within 
the same buildings as these companies, could possibly work effectively for the goal of regulating 
the private companies (Freedom from Debt Coalition, 2005).   
The weak authority of the Regulatory Office under the politically constrained and 
financially dependent environments resulted in conflicts and arguments on the determination of 
water tariff, the rate of return, and the identity of the MWSS as a public utility.  For example, 
during the rate rebasing process starting in 2013, the Regulatory Office ordered Manila Water and 
Maynilad to reduce their water tariff by 29.47-percent and 4.82-percent, respectively.  It claimed 
that the concessionaires were unable to justify the need for higher rates based on their business 
and investment plans (GMA News, 2013).  The concessionaires appealed against the decision at 
the International Chamber of Commerce which allowed Maynilad to increase its water tariff by 
9.8-percent.  Since 1997, when the concessions were granted, the bidding rates increased for the 
Manila Water by more than six times and for the Maynilad by more than four times after inflation 
adjustment (MWSS Regulatory Office, 2017).  Compared to the water rate of pre-privatization, 
water rates in the east and the west zone are a little more than two times after inflation adjustment 
(MWSS Regulatory Office, 2017).  
Another issue lies in the identity of the MWSS as a publicly owned entity under the 
corporation model.  The rate of return for Manila Water in the agreement was only 5.2-percent, 
whereas the rate of return for the Maynilad was 10.4-percent.  Later, the Manila Water increased 
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its rate of return to 9.3-percent through international arbitration (Freedom from Debt Coalition, 
2009).  However, it is reported that the Manila Water earned nearly a 41-percent rate of return in 
1999, even though only 12-percent-percent profit is allowed for public utilities under the coverage 
of public service law (Freedom from Debt Coalition, 2009).  The board of the Regulatory Office 
issued the resolution that deemed Manila Water and Maynilad entered into an agreement with 
MWSS on the understanding that they would be mere agents of the public utility and the limit of 
12-percent profit would not be applied to agents.  Then, water advocates, led by the Freedom from 
Debt Coalition and Bantay Tubig, filed a petition seeking to invalidate the resolution (PCIJ, 2006).  
The higher profit-making of private concessionaires defeats the essence of publicly owned service, 
and the resolution declaring that the two water concessionaires are mere agents and contractors of 
the Regulatory Office, leads to the question if the Regulatory Office acts in favor of the interests 
of concessionaires.   
 
5-2) Water shortage since 2018 
Since 2018, Manila has suffered from water shortage.  Manila Water explained that the 
problem was lumped with the effects of El Niño and the delay of water infrastructure projects, 
such as the construction of a wastewater treatment plant in Cardona, Rizal and the Kaliwa Dam in 
Tanay, Rizal (ABS CBN News, 2019).  Then, current President Rodrigo Duterte castigated 
officials of the MWSS, Manila Water, and Maynilad over the water shortage and threatened to 
terminate the contract with concessionaires (GMA News, 2019).  He claimed that “the officials 
knew of the problem leading to the water shortage but they did not resolve to prevent it from 
happening” (GMA News, 2019).  However, the current shortage is not only the outcome of El 
Niño or delayed supply project, but is also the outcome of a lack of water conservation and 
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integrated water management approaches.  Since the concessions were granted in 1997, the number 
of connections have tripled and the needs for business and agriculture have kept growing as well  
(ABS CBN News, 2019).  Without conservation and integrated water management strategies, 
which seems to be absent in Manila’s water policy under private operation, the shortage would 
likely continue with increasing population and business.  The strategies require a series of 
processes to promote the coordinated development and management plan on water, land, and 
related resources.  They are often beyond the capability of single water entity like the MWSS, and 
therefore the coordination should be led by the central government for multiple jurisdictions and 
levels of governments, user groups, developers, and civil society organizations.  The current water 
shortage in Manila raises a concern about the dependency of the government on private 
concessionaires and lack of management capability in their end.  
 
6) Conclusions   
First, the Philippines government aggressively passed the Water Crisis Law and authorized 
President Ramos to conduct the reform of MWSS, indicating that Manila water policy to 
privatization was not the outcome of coalition formation as assumed in the ACF.  The government 
attempted to seek a transparent bidding process, qualified concessionaires, and unambiguous 
contract agreements by hiring external consultants for technical and financial advice.  Their efforts 
resulted in creating two separate service zones for quasi-competition, the creation of the 
Regulatory Office, and a detailed tariff adjustment policy coupled with a performance bond.  Yet, 
incomplete information, unjustified debt distribution, and unforeseen events such as 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis resulted in the bankruptcy of Maynilad.  While the service improvement and profit 
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made by Manila Water proves the potential success of privatization, the bailout of Maynilad 
ironically represents a failure of privatization.  
Second, during the bailouts of Maynilad, several civil society organizations with social 
belief such as Bantay Tubig and Freedom From Debt Coalition called for re-municipalization of 
the MWSS, but did not succeed in making a policy change to the public model.  The low water 
tariff initially submitted by private concessionaires and the positive experience in the power sector 
under the private management model supported the belief that the private model would work in 
Manila’s water management.  This confirms that policy core belief from another subsystem like 
the power sector influences the decision-making in the water policy subsystem.     
Third, the government claimed that the MWSS regulatory office took adequate measures 
in determination of rebasing and adequate discount rate to ensure the concessionaires could not 
increase water rate impulsively.  Yet, the office has been funded by concessionaires, implying that 
the office has not been independent from influence of concessionaires.  Several incidents such as 
2003 E.Coli outbreak, pollution of Manila Bay, and current water shortage prove that stronger 
government regulation and enforcement, as well as coordination for integrated water resource 
management, are necessary for the  stability and success of water policy under private operation 
in Manila.  
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4.0 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS   
As discussed previously, the goal of this study is not to generalize outcomes of policy but 
rather to provide rich, contextualized understandings of water privatization and re-
municipalization experiences through the case studies.  Yet, in an environment where evidences 
for improving policy making and implementation are held in high esteem, policy makers and 
researchers would be benefited by comparative analysis derived from four cases of this study in 
relation to policy implications and knowledge claims.  For this purpose, Figure 15 presents 
network maps of the four cases in this study that show key stakeholders, their core beliefs on water 
and jurisdiction, and their interactions among each other.  
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Cochabamba Uruguay 
  
Johannesburg Manila 
  
Figure 15. Key stakeholders and their interactions with other stakeholders in four cases 
Brown represents the social belief; Blue represents administration belief; Yellow represents 
economic belief; Green represents ecological belief following Table 2; Purple and pink in 
Johannesburg map represents governmental and corporation units, respectively; Red in Uruguay 
map represents venues for coordination and participatory spaces / nonprofit in circle; public in 
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triangle; private in diamond; state-owned in square / Ties among stakeholders mean relationship 
as explained in Page 16 
4.1 INCREASING POLITICAL LEVERAGE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS 
IN WATER POLICY SUBSYSTEM 
Figure 15 indicates that a number of civil society organizations (CSOs) at local levels 
participated in water policy making and they often created a powerful coalition like the 
COORDINADORA in Cochabamba and the CNDAV in Uruguay.  The civil society organizations 
rising against water privatization in four cases of this study appear that they are rooted at local and 
national levels, and do not originate in international CSOs, though many national campaigns have 
been supported by international CSOs for publicizing the anti-privatization campaign and 
leveraging power against the transnational private companies.  Several sources also confirm that 
there has been increasing grassroots social mobilization toward public provision of water 
empowered by civil society organizations at the local level (Khagram, 2004; Nelson, 2015).   In 
the case of Cochabamba, for example, a variety of CSOs at the local level participated in 
Coordinadora and led the re-municipalization of the SEMAPA through a series of massive 
protests.  International CSOs influenced the decision-making over Bechtel’s dispute against the 
Bolivian government at the World Bank’s International Center for the Settlement of Investment 
Dispute (ICSID) by forming activist networks and maximizing solidarity actions.  Their actions 
resulted in the cancellation of the Bechtel’s dispute and helped the Bolivian government to re-
municipalize the SEMAPA without a financial penalty.  Similar to Coordinadora, CNDAV in 
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Uruguay, and Coalition Against Water Privatization in South Africa have been playing a crucial 
role in advocating public provision in their water policy subsystem.   
4.2 DIFFERENT LEVELS OF CORE BELIEFS TOWARD PRIVATE AND PUBLIC 
PROVISIONS 
1) Strong economic core belief held by the World Bank 
Some key stakeholders prove to have a stronger policy core belief toward private provision 
than others.  President Banzer in Bolivia and President Ramos in Philippines, for example, actively 
adopted the pro-privatization policies of previously state-owned facilities during their 
presidencies.  Their economic belief is in line with the World Bank, which has attempted to 
translate their economic belief that water is an economic good and thus needs to be managed by 
market-oriented approaches, and who has worked to integrate this belief into the client nation’s 
water policy through their loan conditionalities.  Such a normative core belief of this economic 
belief held by the World Bank is studied by several resources which describe the World Bank as 
“a partial learner” who seems to be unable to resolve contradictions among its espoused 
development goals, profit-making imperative, and neoliberal ideology (Storey, 2000; Travis, 
2011).   
 
2) Weak economic core belief addressing that private concession as only a tool to solve issues 
in water management 
All decisions to private concession are not necessarily connected to the core economic 
belief, which challenges the assumption of the ACF that policy is made by the interaction of policy 
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participants who strive to translate components of their belief systems into actual policy.  For 
example, the private concessions in Johannesburg and Uruguay are less influenced by the belief 
systems held by those governments.  The government of Johannesburg, under the South Africa 
Constitution that clearly recognizes a human right to water, has created a corporation entity, 
Johannesburg Water, to deal with non-revenue water and a non-payment culture leftover from the 
Apartheid era.  Therefore, the decision of private concession of the Johannesburg Water lies on 
their focus on the issue of cost recovery rather than their core belief of the social belief.  The 
concession in Johannesburg Water ended in five years and was not renewed, confirming that the 
concession was utilized as a temporary tool and not followed by a core belief of the economic 
belief.  In case of Uruguay, the private concession was granted only limited areas in the department 
of Maldonado for the purpose of financing expanded service project.  Therefore, the private 
concession in Uruguay is seen as a government’s response to urgent needs of expanding water 
service rather than the outcome of their belief.  That is, the level of belief toward the private 
concessions hold by the Uruguay and Johannesburg governments is not normative like the deep 
core belief held by the World Bank, but closer to the secondary belief which is more substantive 
and empirical based.  If new experience and information raises a concern on water quality and 
maintenance issue under private provision, governments with a weak secondary belief toward 
private concession would likely give up their current privatization policy and return their water 
entity to public hands, such as the case of Uruguay.  The different levels of core belief toward 
water privatization explain why the water privatization policy continues in some places but 
discontinues in other places.  
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3) Strong demand for public provision from those who hold social and ecological beliefs   
The cancellations of private concessions in Cochabamba and Uruguay confirm that the 
decision to re-municipalize their water entity is the result of a coalition among stakeholders 
advocating public provision as an alternative policy.  For example, in the case of Uruguay, a variety 
of civil society organizations (CSOs) participated in CNDAV and successfully turned over the 
decision of private concession through 2004 water referendum.  The cancellation of private 
concession in Uruguay proves that it is supported by coalitions with two different policy core 
beliefs.  In detail, the CNDAV with heterogeneous member groups called for not only a human 
right to water, but also emphasized environmental issues, integrated management of water 
resources, and public participation.  Especially, CSOs with ecological belief such as REDES-AT 
(Friends of the Earth-Uruguay) called for environmental justice by addressing the need of 
preserving and protecting aquifer for water as a social and ecological good.  The integrated 
approach of the CNDAV against the water privatization demands a public provision to address 
environmental and socioeconomic inequity compatibly, successfully creating the linkage between 
the social and ecological beliefs.  Their strong core beliefs toward public provision have been 
reflected in the new constitution amended in Uruguay.  Similar to Uruguay, Bolivia and South 
Africa implemented the beliefs that water is a social and ecological good and require the public 
provision of water management in their constitutions.  The private concession is still available 
under the public water utility in these countries, but the government still maintains the legal 
obligation to protect, respect, and fulfill the human and environmental right to water.   
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4.3 POLICY TOWARD PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE BY MULTIPLE 
STAKEHOLDERS 
The amended constitutions in Uruguay and South Africa incorporates not only a human 
right to water, but also enhanced mechanisms and institutions for participatory governance in water 
management.  Uruguay, for example, created institutionalized civic spaces such as COASAS and 
DINAGUA (marked in red in Figure 15) for multiple stakeholders’ participation and coordination 
among different levels and jurisdiction of governments.  Similarly, the Catchment Management 
Forum and the Water and Sanitation Forum in South Africa have served as a civic space for 
participation.  When it comes to putting the emancipatory elements of the constitution into 
practice, there are many limiting factors, such as social conflict and polarization as observed in the 
2007 Social Unrest in Cochabamba.  It is too early to evaluate the participatory approaches at this 
point.  Empirically, Flynn et al. examines Irish government which has attempted to cope with 
participatory features of the Water Framework Directive (2000) in their water policy through 
greater formal and informal local and national networking.  They report that they see little evidence 
of change in values, beliefs and preferences, which are confirmed in their study as slow to change.  
This indicates that signs of policy learning and reconciliation through participation appear weak 
and too early to discern (Flynn et al., 2003). Yet, the Advocacy Coalition Framework argues that 
such emancipatory elements of constitutions and policies improve, in theory, the degrees of 
consensus and openness of political systems and ultimately are expected to contribute to long-term 
stability of policy subsystem.   
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4.4 POLICY LEARNING WITHIN AND ACROSS COALITIONS 
The turnaround of the African National Congress (ANC) from driving nationalization 
agenda to corporatization model with providing free basic water in the post-Apartheid era indicates 
that policy learning takes in place within a coalition and challenges the assumption of the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework that policy core belief is hardly mutable.  The policy learning 
occurs across coalitions in the South African government seem to strike a balance among 
stakeholders with different beliefs on water by forming close interactions and opening a civic space 
for participation.  This policy learning across coalitions in South Africa resulted in contradicting 
institutional arrangements, such as the Free Basic Water, the Increasing Block Tariff, and prepaid 
meter installation.  These contradicting institutional arrangements do not mean that the 
government’s approaches to water management are ‘apolitical’ but are a more antagonistic and 
collective decision-making aspect of environmental politics.   
This study also confirms that policy learning can occur across countries.  Figure 16 shows 
the timeline of major policy changes and events in the four case studies for comparison.   
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Figure 16. Policy learning across countries 
Source: own analysis 
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Uruguay’s government, for example, after learning about the dispute of Bechtel against the 
Bolivian government, implemented the transitory provision in their constitution which would help 
them to avoid potential lawsuit from private concessionaires.  However, at the worldwide scale, 
policy learning across multiple countries seems to occur erratically.  While the OSE in Uruguay 
has served as a leader of Public-Public Partnerships among water entities in Latin America that 
aims to foster better public provision through policy learning, the Philippine government has 
pursued private provision of the water sector and re-privatized Maynilad even after its bankruptcy 
in 2001. This proves that many of the fundamental elements of policy learning remain conceptually 
unclear (Jenkins-Smith et al., 1994) and, as a result, the entire phenomenon of policy learning 
across countries remains difficult to operationalize.   
One potential explanation for such an erratic learning across countries can be explained by 
the level of human interaction and trusts among key decision makers.  Marsden et al., for example, 
studies how cities approach policy learning by analyzing multiple cities and their transportation 
policies in Northern Europe and North America.  They report that while a lot of information on 
policy change and implementation available through the internet, such information is not seen to 
be reliable source to key decision makers who are dominated the process of initiating policy 
transfer (Marsden et al., 2011).  The study finds that key decision makers rather rely on their trusted 
networks of peers for lessons as they can access the real implementation story and the unwritten 
lessons. Marsden et al., concludes that human interaction in a trustable network is the most 
important source for policy transfer across cities (Marsden et al., 2011).  This may be a clue to the 
question why Uruguay government has stopped private concessions, but not Manila government, 
given that both observed extreme conflicts of the Cochabamba Water War.  
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  The increasing trend of private sector participation in water sector since 1990 stopped in 
2007 and the number of private sector participation dropped significantly in 2010, as shown in 
Figure 16.  The relationship of the decreasing number of private sector participation and policy 
learning process is yet unclear.  However, powerful coalitions with the social belief discerned from 
this study and their efforts to build international solidarity against multinational private sectors and 
pro-market policies of international donors have inevitably influenced on the decision making 
toward private sector participation.  
 
 
Figure 17. Number of private sector participations in water sector 
Source: own analysis. Data from World Bank 
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4.5 INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS TO INFLUENCE ON THE STABILITY OF 
WATER POLICY SUBSYSTEM 
As shown in Figure 16, several internal events occur in four water policy subsystems with 
respect to water quality, maintenance, and water rates.  Some of the events became a “shock” and 
resulted in water policy change to public provision while other events were not impactful enough 
to lead to policy change.  For instance, a series of water main breaks, E. Coli outbreaks, and water 
rate hikes in Maldonado, Uruguay, stimulated the formation of CNDAV and the private concession 
was eventually canceled.  The water rate hike caused by the Misicuni project in Cochabamba was 
the one of main reasons for the formation of Coordinadora which contributed to the re-
municipalization of SEMAPA.  On the other hand, the events of E. Coli outbreak, bailout of 
Maynilad, pollution of Manila Bay, and current water shortage in Philippines have not been able 
to justify re-municipalization of the MWSS in Philippines yet.   
External events such as the winning of the political parties in election—for example, the 
Movement for Socialism in Bolivia, the Broad Front in Uruguay, and the African National 
Congress in South Africa—made a big impact on water policy subsystem.  The winning political 
parties in all the three cases have implemented a human right to water and participatory approaches 
in water policy by amending their constitutions and related legislation, as well as by creating a 
civic space for the participation of multiple stakeholders.  Their core beliefs toward public 
provision are implemented through democratic processes such as referendum and national election 
as opposed to the top-down approach to water privatization.  Such national political context 
surrounding the water policy subsystem designates stronger consensus toward public provision of 
resource management.  Therefore, the decision of public provision in water management under the 
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amended constitutions is likely irreversible in these three countries.  The private concession is still 
allowed under public provision in Bolivia and South Africa but remains contentious in Uruguay.  
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5. ADVANTAGES AND LIMITS OF THE ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK 
AS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF WATER POLICY IN 
THE GLOBAL SOUTH 
This study shows that the ACF, as one of the most well-developed policy process 
frameworks, is useful to understand water policy processes of the four case studies.  In essence, 
the ACF provides both a framework which bounds inquiry and focuses on certain variables (e.g., 
belief, coalition, events, etc.), as well as a set of theories which specify relationships among 
identified variables.  Therefore, the ACF helps this study to construct analyses of water policy 
processes involving substantial belief conflicts among participants, important technical disputes, 
and the multiple actors who appeared in the context analysis of this study.  This confirms that the 
ACF is applicable in analyzing and understanding water policy processes in the Global South.  
However, this study finds it difficult to proceed with three points that appeared in the case 
studies within the ACF: 1) policy diffusion which occurs by international donors’ incentives on 
privatization, 2) governments as a bounded actor opposed to a rational actor, and 3) the mechanism 
of collective decision-making in South Africa.  First, the ACF does not clearly distinguish the 
difference between policy learning and policy diffusion.  According to Meseguer, policy learning 
is voluntary whereas policy diffusion is somewhat coercive and pushed by incentives from other 
powerful actors (Meseguer, 2005).  Though there is a notable degree of overlap between policy 
learning and policy diffusion, and the presence of horizontal diffusion and emulation makes any 
attempts to empirically test the difference more complicated, as the distinction between two would 
provide a clearer idea how the water policy, especially the decision to water privatization, was 
formulated under the pressure of international donors.  A more analytical lens to proceed the term 
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of ‘policy learning’ would be beneficial in the ACF.  Secondly, the ACF is limited in that it does 
not fully explain if the government is a rational or a bounded actor.  If a government is a rational 
actor, they have full analytical capabilities, scan all available information regardless of its origins 
and values represented by different coalitions, and interpret all information in the same manner.  
Then they would be able to draw the same conclusions about the relative merits of different policies 
and marginalizing prior beliefs about policies in the light of mounting evidence, positive or 
negative.  On the other hand, if a government is a bounded actor, they search only for relevant 
information which is available in their hands or geographically, culturally, and historically close 
to them.  In this study, the Philippines congress passed the Water Crisis Act and the BOT Act and 
authorized President Ramos to make a quick decision on the privatization of the MWSS.  The 
decision of the MWSS privatization was not the outcome of coalitions’ competition as assumed in 
the ACF, indicating that some policies are made by powerful key actors in government.  The policy 
decision by any political elite like a president, often happens especially in developing countries 
where a corporatist system is more dominant rather than a pluralist system.  If the competition of 
coalition is not the causal explanation to certain policy process, it would be helpful to more deeply 
analyze the nature of key actors in governments and see whether they make the decision in a 
rational way or bounded way and how the way they make decisions influence the responses of 
coalitions formed afterward.  Lastly, the ACF is limited in that it does not fully explain the 
mechanism of collaborative process, which is an increasing trend in water management policy.  
The term of policy-learning defined in the ACF shows that each coalition learns and changes their 
beliefs with new information and experience, but it needs to address how stakeholders work 
together to reconcile their beliefs in a collaborative process and in what conditions, as well as detail 
how policy outputs and consensus are produced in a collaborative process.      
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6. CONTRIBUTION OF THIS STUDY TO LITERATURE 
The contributions of this study to the literature are two-fold.  First, this study provides a 
new approach of network analysis to water policy field as a lens that identifies emerging actors, 
their policy core beliefs, and coalitions in water policy subsystem.  The identification of multiple 
actors and their policy core beliefs under network analysis constitutes a contribution to literature 
and future research development, since it develops a greater understanding of the perspectives, 
interests, and main concerns of the various actors co-existing in water policy subsystem.  By 
tracing network structure as a proxy for the relationship and influence in decision-making, the 
presence and absence of networks around the government and key actors indicate the powerful 
coalitions as well as potential opportunities for collaboration and more participatory approaches 
needed in water policy making.   
Second, this study, by applying timeline on Advocacy Coalition Framework, adds more 
explanatory power to the framework.  Advocacy Coalition Framework captures a wide range of 
variables and they are typically presented in a static way as shown in Figure 2.  This way is difficult 
to explain causal relationships among the variables under a complex policymaking environment.  
This study suggests an improved way of presenting variables which records and follows the 
timeline of main policy change, external events, emerging coalitions, and outcomes, making it 
easier to understand the dynamic relationship of the variables.  
 In sum, this research generates a part of the much-needed data to facilitate public 
discussion and decision-making on national water policy in the Global South.  Currently, compiled 
data is too limited to indicate how stakeholders’ core beliefs have been shaped and polarized, and 
how civil society participation effectively influence water policy making.  The increasing political 
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leverage of civil society discerned from this study would be useful for offering opportunity for 
politicians and governments to build a civic space for participation, for designing subsidies and 
tariffs for the needy, and for understanding ideological debates over privatization and re-
municipalization.  In addition, increasing calls for a human right to water and participatory 
governance and government’s responses to the calls observed in this study disrupts the historical 
public-private continuum, providing new governance alternatives to overcome the chronic 
challenges in water sector that neither public nor private sector could have untangled.   
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